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Proponents of regulatory competition have presented their most detailed
arguments in the field of corporate law, but have also made a similar case
in other areas, including securities regulation. Proponents of regulatory
competition in securities regulation argue that our markets would be best
served if (a) states or nations competed to provide legal regimes to govern
securities transactions, or (b) domestic or international securities
exchanges competed for listings of companies whose transactions would be
governed by the rules of the exchange. Theoretically, states and other
nations would compete to provide legal regimes governing securities
transactions, or perhaps exchanges could compete for listings by offering
varieties of legal regimes for securities transactions. Companies could then
choose to be governed by the laws and/or listing requirements that best
accommodate their needs. This Article is the first to comprehensively
discuss all of these various manifestations of regulatory competition in
securities law. It demonstrates that in all of these forms, true competition is
likely to be insufficient and likely to represent a stroll toward the bottom
rather than a race to the top. Providers of regulation are insufficiently
motivated to provide innovative and efficient regulatory schemes. More
significantly, managers functionally choose where to incorporate or where
to list, meaning that, in a system of regulatory competition, the fox
determines which rules will govern the operation of the henhouse. A
significant amount of empirical evidence supports the notion that the best
regulatory model is the current strong-SEC regulatory model that other
nations have begun to strongly emulate. Capital markets would be better
served by efforts to improve the strong-SEC model than by attempting to
replace it with regulatory competition.
1. INTRODUCTION
There are three competing visions for the future of securities regulation:
(a) private contracting, (b) regulatory competition, and (c) what I term the
"strong-SEC" model.
* Ed & Molly Smith Centennial Professor of Business Law, McCombs School of
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The private contracting model calls for substantially lessened
governmental regulation of the securities markets based upon the notion that
market participants can voluntarily contract for the most efficient levels of
disclosure and fraud protection.' I have objected previously to the private
contracting model, articulating arguments based upon principles derived
from behavioral law and economics. 2 I have also made the case for a "strong-
SEC" model.3 What I have not done is directly address the regulatory
competition model, a notable oversight given that no other proposal for
shaping the future of securities regulation has received more academic
attention over the last quarter century. 4
The theory of regulatory competition has had its most prominent
explication in the area of corporate law. Proponents believe that business
firms would be best served if either states or nations competed for
incorporations. The idea is that there would be a "race to the top" as these
various regimes attempted to best each other by writing ever more efficient
rules of law that would attract incorporations by firms hoping to serve their
shareholders' interests well.
Proponents have exported regulatory competition to many other areas of
law, including, importantly for purposes of this Article, securities regulation.
Proponents of regulatory competition in securities regulation argue that our
markets would be best served if (a) states or nations competed to provide
legal regimes to govern securities transactions, or (b) securities exchanges
competed for listings of companies whose transactions would be governed by
the rules of the exchange. Theoretically, states and other nations would
compete to provide legal regimes governing securities transactions, or
1 See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based
Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279, 279 (2000) (suggesting that securities professionals be
totally deregulated and investors be regulated instead).
2 Robert A. Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A
Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 337 (2003) (criticizing cases allowing law
investors to contract away the securities laws' fraud protection); Robert A. Prentice,
Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for
Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397 (2002) (directly addressing Choi's proposal for regulating
investors).
3 See Robert A. Prentice & Frank Cross, The Economic Value of the SEC and
Mandatory Disclosure Requirements (2005) (on file with author) (making an empirical
argument for the strong-SEC model); Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong
SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming May 2006) (making the nonempirical case for
the strong-SEC model).
4 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms 'Decisions Where to Incorporate,
46 J.L. & EcON. 383, 384 (2003) (noting that the notion that state competition creates a
"race to the top" in American corporate law "appears to dominate the current thinking of
corporate law academics...").
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perhaps exchanges could compete for listings by offering varieties of legal
regimes for securities transactions. Companies could then choose to be
governed by the laws and/or listing requirements that best accommodated
their needs.
In these alternative regimes, the SEC would be largely unnecessary.
Professors Romano, Choi, and Guzman, among others, have argued that most
everyone would gain if companies could choose to opt into a variety of
regimes containing much lower (and much less expensive) disclosure and
governance requirements than those promulgated by the SEC. In their desired
world, issuers could choose any regulation, or even no regulation.
5
The purpose of this Article is to address the most recent theoretical and
empirical evidence regarding the viability and directionality of regulatory
competition in modem securities markets and to speculate about the state of
affairs that might ensue if the current strong-SEC model were replaced. This
is the first Article to look at securities regulatory competition in all of its
theoretical forms, to demonstrate the ubiquity of the downward direction of
that competition, and to provide a clear theory to explain the empirical
evidence.
Part II reviews the familiar debate over state regulatory competition in
the corporate law field that has served as a basis for extension of the model to
other fields. Part III examines the state regulatory competition model as
extended to securities regulation. Part IV looks at the international regulatory
competition model for securities regulation. Part V appraises regulatory
competition among domestic securities exchanges. Part VI analyzes
regulatory competition among all securities exchanges, foreign and domestic.
The picture that the evidence paints in each of these areas is one of little
meaningful regulatory competition and, to the extent that any competition
exists, a relaxed stroll to the bottom rather than a race to the top. Part VII
provides some explanations for the observed trends and draws some
inferences regarding the future of securities law under a world of regulatory
competition.
5 See Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets?: A Political Economy of Issuer
Choice in International Securities Regulation, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1363, 1367-68
[hereinafter Tung, Monopolists] (noting the free market goals of regulatory competition
enthusiasts).
Coffee also likes the idea of regulatory competition, but believes that it may well
lead to higher and more uniform, rather than lower and more diverse, standards. See John
C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market
Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1757 (2002)
[hereinafter Coffee, Racing Towards the Top]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History:
The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93
Nw. U. L. REv. 641 (1999) [hereinafter Coffee, Future as History].
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This Article will challenge many of the assumptions of regulatory
competition. One such assumption, that states (or nations) will behave like
profit-maximizing firms and thereby produce optimally efficient corporate
law, was recently disputed by Hadfield and Talley in a paper in which they
suggested that private companies would be more properly motivated
providers of efficient law. 6 While they provide persuasive reasons to doubt
the assumption that providers of corporate law are optimally motivated, this
Article focuses more centrally on the equally dubious assumption that the
buyers of corporate and securities law are optimally motivated to purchase
efficient rules.7 Almost all corporation law and much securities law exist to
solve the classic agency problem, to restrain agents from benefiting at the
expense of their principals. Yet regulatory competition functionally allows
agents to select the rules that will govern their actions. In so doing, it simply
assumes away this well-established agency problem and functionally allows
the foxes to establish the rules that will govern the henhouse. This major flaw
is the primary reason that state and national regulatory competition (or
private contracting, for that matter) should not be the focus of efforts to
improve corporate and securities law. Fortunately, while many academics
have mired themselves in a debate over regulatory competition, few real
world actors have taken it seriously, enabling Part VIII of this Article to
sound a hopeful concluding note.
II. STATE CORPORATE LAW COMPETITION
The various securities law competition models that are the primary focus
of this Article are derived from the familiar state corporate law competition
6 Gillian K. Hadfield & Eric L. Talley, On Public Versus Private Provision of
Corporate Law 11 (Univ. S. Cal. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper
No. 04-18; Univ. S. Cal. CLEO Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. C04-13,
2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=570641 (challenging the "central premise of
the regulatory competition literature [which] is that legislators (and other public actors)
effectively behave like profit-maximizing firms, choosing laws and regulations that
maximize state 'profits"').
7 See Frederick Tung, Passports, Private Choice, and Private Interests: Regulatory
Competition and Cooperation in Corporate, Securities, and Bankruptcy Law, 3 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 369, 370 (2002) [hereinafter Tung, Passports] (assuming, for purposes of his
argument, that providers of securities law are not motivated to provide the most efficient
law, that the firm managers are motivated to choose legal regimes in order to maximize
firm value).
The problem with buyers explains why Hadfield and Talley's private contracting
solution is not workable. See Hadfield & Talley, surpa note 6. But that issue will not be
addressed here.
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model, 8 which was forged in the heat of a debate between William Cary and
Ralph Winter regarding whether state competition for corporate charters
would likely lead to a "race to the top" in which state legislatures would
compete for corporate charters by providing default rules that favored
shareholder interests (Winter's view)9 or a "race to the bottom" in which
state legislatures would compete by enacting default rules that favored
managers' interests at the expense of shareholders (Cary's view). 10 Both
articles and many that followed were based on an assumption that
meaningful levels of such competition existed. Perhaps the fact that no one
could determine with any certainty which direction the competition was
flowing should have been a hint that it was not, in fact, a significant force.
A. No Meaningful Competition Exists
Both Cary'1 and Winter 12 gained adherents to their points of view, but
the evidence that significant competition for incorporations occurs among the
states has been largely indirect. Much of the case made by Professor
Romano, for example, has always been based on statistics about firms that
reincorporated. Reincorporation is not a frequent event, so generalizing from
this atypical category is obviously questionable.13
In discussing incentives for states to engage in such competition,
Romano has focused nearly exclusively on Delaware's revenues from
8 To a large extent these models are, in turn, based upon the Tiebout model of public
goods provision. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956). This model has been undermined by evolving economic thinking in a
recent article that "highlights the hollowness of the [Tiebout] model's assumption that
government actors have incentives to act entrepreneurially." William W. Bratton &
Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary
Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201,206 (1997).
9 Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
10 William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974).
11 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992)
[hereinafter Bebchuk, Desirable Limits].
12 Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913 (1982).
13 See Robert Daimes, The Incorporation Choices of 1PO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1559, 1568 (2002) [hereinafter Daimes, Incorporation Choices] ("[B]ecause the subset of
reincorporating firms is not a random sample of public firms, it is hard to generalize the
results.").
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incorporations, 14 but has necessarily ignored the fact that despite the
theoretical incentive to compete with Delaware, no other state, with the
possible minor exceptions of Maryland and Nevada, has in recent years
genuinely sought to gain revenue in the same fashion. 15
The fact that no state other than Delaware gains any significant franchise
tax revenue by attracting incorporations renders largely meaningless the
related argument that there is a correlation between a state's total tax
collections coming from the franchise tax and the speed with which its
legislature enacts certain corporate law reforms. 16
Virtually all companies incorporate initially either in their home states or
in Delaware, so states other than Delaware have little to gain, revenue-wise,
by enacting efficient corporate law. All things being equal, states would, of
course, wish to retain the incorporations they already have. However, those
incorporations generate a very modest amount of revenue for most states and,
as noted, reincorporations are quite rare. Between 1978 and 2000, over 6000
firms went public, 17 yet only 600 or so of all existing public companies
reincorporated, 18 meaning that states generally need not be particularly
concerned about losing the incorporations they already have.
Romano has noted that "[i]nnovations in corporation codes that firms
emphasize as provisions leading them to change their incorporation state
spread rapidly across the states in a pattern resembling the S-shaped diffusion
curve of technological innovations," 19 drawing the nonobvious conclusion
that states must be competing for incorporations. She ignores the fact that
14 ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 6-7 (1993)
[hereinafter ROMANO, GENIUS].
15 Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law,
55 STAN. L. REv. 679, 687-88 (2002) ("In all states other than Delaware.... franchise
taxes are not structured to raise substantial revenues from incorporations, even if a state
succeeded in attracting a substantial fraction of publicly traded companies.").
16 After an exhaustive study, Kahan and Kamar note: "Delaware aside, no state
gains material franchise tax revenues by attracting incorporations. Since incorporations
do not increase franchise taxes, the correlation between franchise taxes and the enactment
of corporate law innovations cannot be caused by more responsive states attracting more
incorporations." Id. at 700. See also Daines, Incorporation Choices, supra note 13, at
1574 (noting that because states outside Delaware have structured their franchise taxes
based on business done in-state, "incorporations have no meaningful impact on the state's
marginal revenue").
17 Daines, Incorporation Choices, supra note 13, at 1569.
18 Id.
19 ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 14, at 16.
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most kinds of law, including those where no competition could remotely be
occurring, diffuse in the same manner.20
The most obvious way that other states could compete with Delaware
would be to create a special corporate. court system to compete with
Delaware's chancery courts, yet few other states have made the effort to do
so.21 Nor is there any evidence ofjudicial competition.
Furthermore, to the extent that there are modest differences in statutory
law from state to state, they do not seem to be directed principally to the goal
of attracting incorporations. Rather, they are done to satisfy local political
constituencies, such as owners of local closely held corporations or managers
of local public corporations. 22
Thus, it appears that over the years, both sides of the race-to-the-
top/race-to-the-bottom debate simply lost sight of the forest for the trees.
Fortunately, in three recent articles, authors have stepped back to see the big
picture and it is this: there is no meaningful competition among the states for
incorporations. State corporate competition is largely a myth.23
Delaware wishes to maintain its preeminent position as the most
important site for incorporations; other states do not seem particularly
motivated to attempt to dethrone the reigning champ. If any would like to
make a serious run at doing so,24 they are not taking any significant steps
20 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 15, at 715-16 ("Many statutory innovations in areas
where states do not compete diffuse among states along ogive [(S-shaped)] curves. These
areas include welfare, health, education, conservation, planning, administrative
organization, highways, civil rights, corrections and police, labor, taxes, and professional
regulation. Even abortion laws exhibit a similar pattern of diffusion.").
Kahan and Kamar also studied the diffusion of important Model Business
Corporation Act provisions and found no evidence supporting Romano's theory. Id at
702.
21 Id at 708-15.
22 Id. at 701-24.
23 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 555 (2002)
("The alleged vigorous race among states vying for incorporations, we argue, simply does
not exist."); Daimes, Incorporation Choices, supra note 13, at 1562 ("[T]he dominant
metaphor of a national race between fifty states or a single market with fifty producers is
incorrect and potentially misleading."); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate
Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CoRP. L. 625, 634 (2004) (concluding
that state-to-state competition in the corporate governance field is "illusory"); Kahan &
Kamar, supra note 15, at 684 ("[T]he very notion that states compete for incorporations is
a myth. Other than Delaware, no state is engaged in significant efforts to attract
incorporations of public companies.").
24 One may argue that Nevada and Maryland have an interest here, but Maryland's
interest seems to be limited to attracting mutual funds. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note
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toward attaining that goal and it probably would not do them any good to try,
because Delaware enjoys formidable advantages.25
Simply put, Delaware won the "competition" for incorporations
decisively and long ago.26 Its "dominance is staggering. '27 Eighty-five
percent of all "out-of-state" incorporations occur in Delaware. 28 Viewed
another way, ninety-seven percent of companies incorporate either in their
home state or in Delaware. 29 States do not meaningfully compete for the
other three percent30 and there is no strong reason why they should.31 As
each year goes by, Delaware's advantage, now a century in the making,
grows larger. 32
Because of the lack of competition, differences in corporate law among
the other forty-nine states are minor and generally unimportant. 33 The states
tend to imitate, rather than innovate. 34 Even Romano admits that the
"substantive content [of the fifty state corporation codes] is substantially
15, at 721-22. Nevada seems to target only close corporations, and "with regard to public
corporations Nevada has done little, derived minuscule benefits, and had trivial success."
Id. at 718. Nevada's fee revenues from public incorporations is only $26,200 per year and
its market share of IPO incorporations is 1.1% and falling. Id. at 720.
25 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 23, at 597 ("[B]arriers to entry, network effects,
large sunk costs, managerial control over reincorporation decisions, and the risk of
strategic response by Delaware will deter rival states from mounting a meaningful
challenge to Delaware in the ordinary course of events.").
26 See Daines, Incorporation Choices, supra note 13, at 1572 ("Delaware law
governs more than 97% of assets of public firms incorporated outside of their home state,
while together, Delaware's nearest four rivals split 0.6% of the market between them.").
27 Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 136 (2004) (noting that 300,000 companies are
incorporated in Delaware, including 300 of the Fortune 500; New York has the next
highest number of Fortune 500 companies with 25); see Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The
Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103
MICH. L. REv. 1, 143 (2004) (noting that Delaware has no meaningful rivals).
28 See Jones, supra note 23, at 632.
29 See Daires, Incorporation Choices, supra note 13, at 1562.
30 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 23, at 581 ("[S]tates have not even
structured their incorporation taxes and fees in a way that would provide them with
meaningful benefits if they were to attract many out-of-state incorporations.").
31 See Daines, Incorporation Choices, supra note 13, at 1574 (noting that "[t]he
financial consequences to states of attracting out-of-state firms are trivial...").
32 See Michael Barzuza, Price Considerations in the Market for Corporate Law, 26
CARDOZO L. REv. 127, 169 (2004) (noting that because of economies of scale and
network effects, "as the number of firms incorporated in Delaware increases, the value of
its charter increases").
33 See Daires, Incorporation Choices, supra note 13, at 1583.
34 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 23, at 606.
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uniform." 35 The picture that state corporate law competition advocates paint
of legislators toiling away to produce innovative and efficient corporate
governance codes in order to attract out-of-state incorporations and attendant
tax revenue is mostly an illusion.
B. Race to the Bottom
States do, of course, offer corporation laws to their companies, but
primarily as a service to them.36 All things being equal, one supposes that
legislatures would prefer to pass efficient laws, but there is no strong reason
why they should compete to do so in this setting. If they are playing a
competition game to some modest extent, their primary motivation must be
to maximize revenues, rather than to produce the most efficient corporate
law. 37 Looking on the supply side and thinking in terms of public choice
literature, there is no compelling reason to believe that individual legislators
will be adequately motivated to provide efficient corporate law. 38
Looking on the demand side, there is every reason to believe that
legislators, to the modest extent that they might be motivated to gain revenue
for their jurisdictions, tend primarily to react to the desires of the managers
of corporations. Managers, not shareholders, make the consumption decision.
Because managers have an effective veto over incorporation and
reincorporation decisions, 39 "[t]he existing state of affairs ... provides
Delaware with incentives to offer rules that managers favor, even if such
rules are not the ones most favorable to shareholders." 40
35 ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR
SECURITIES REGULATION 21 (2002) [hereinafter ROMANO, ADVANTAGE].
36 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 23, at 582.
37 See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation
Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 228 n.3 (1985) (noting that the competition literature
generally has not specified what it is the states are attempting to maximize).
3 8 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 216 (1991) [hereinafter EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE] (noting that "[n]o legislator can capture the benefits to the state
of increased revenue..."); Hadfield & Talley, supra note 6, at 3 (pointing out that
because individual legislators do not benefit directly from more incorporations, it is hard
to see how they are "spurred" to produce efficient law).
39 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 23, at 592 (making this point).
40 Id. at 600.
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1. A Brief History
Delaware acquired the mantle of leading corporation jurisdiction when
Governor Woodrow Wilson of the mantle's previous wearer, New Jersey,
attempted to enforce antitrust laws against the abusive trusts that had made
New Jersey their haven.4 1 These corporations had originally moved to New
Jersey when it amended its corporate law to allow corporations to do what
other states denied them--own stock in other corporations and thereby create
the giant trusts of the late 1800s.42 After Wilson's impertinence, these
corporations simply moved to Delaware and have been there ever since.
43
Delaware strengthened its grip on the leading position in 1929 when it
reduced the requirement for shareholder approval of asset mergers from a
supermajority to a simple majority, giving managers much more discretion
than they previously had enjoyed to effectuate such transactions over
substantial shareholder objection.44 After losing some of its lead, Delaware
regained it by making another round of pro-manager amendments in the
1960s.45
In other words, in every round of active state competition for charters
that occurred before the 1980s, first New Jersey and then Delaware won by
granting managers more and more discretion and leaving shareholders fewer
and fewer protections. This is not to say that all of the decisions were bad or
inefficient, only that the motivating force was obvious.
41 At the time, the U.S. Industrial Commission examined whether federal
incorporation or other federal regulation of corporations would be a good idea, noting
that some states "have apparently, for the sake of securing a certain revenue easily
collected, bid against each other by offering more liberal inducements to corporations."
INDUS. COMM'N FINAL REP. 643 (1902). The report noted that this "demoralizing
tendency in corporation legislation ... makes the task of controlling large corporations
exceedingly difficult." Id.
4 2 DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN
CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 63-64 (2005).
4 3 Id. at 65.
44 Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country
Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 791, 813-14 (2002).
45 See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of
Corporate Federalism 20-21 (European Corporate Governance Inst. (ECGI) Law
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 23, 2004), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=606481 [hereinafter Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium].
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2. Recent Innovations
a. Antitakeover Legislation
The most recent round of state corporate code innovations occurred in
the 1980s. 4 6 The largest part of the innovation involved takeover rules. By
this time, it was too late for any other jurisdiction to overtake Delaware, so
there was no true competition, but, as in other rounds of innovation, the
entire purpose was to "cater[] to management's interest in freedom of
action." 47 Although regulatory competition proponents have tried to spin the
takeover offer law reforms as pro-shareholder, 48 what obviously happened in
the 1980s and 1990s was that several states passed antitakeover legislation to
protect specific local companies against hostile takeover threats.49 The state
legislatures were not trying to attract incorporations; 50 they were simply
attempting to save local companies and attendant jobs and tax revenues. 51
Managers of the companies lobbying for passage of the laws were not
looking out for the best interests of shareholders, whose financial interests
46 Id. at 27-28.
47 Id. at 28.
48 See ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 14, at 52-75. Later, Romano seemed to admit to
the fact that most states enacted laws that attempted to lower the probability of a hostile
takeover in order to benefit managers, not shareholders, in a manifestation of a "race to
the bottom." Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2385 (1998) [hereinafter Romano, Empowering
Investors].
49 See William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 715,
752 (1998) ("[S]tate antitakeover laws may represent cooperative behavior between
managers resisting takeovers and legislators seeking both political support and retention
of local corporations at the expense of shareholders."); Roberta Romano, The Future of
Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 457, 461 (1988)
Romano notes:
The political history of second generation takeover statutes is similar across the
states. The statutes are typically enacted rapidly, with virtually unanimous support
and little public notice, let alone discussion. They are frequently pushed through the
legislature at the behest of a major local corporation that is the target of a hostile bid
or apprehensive that it will become a target.
Id
50 And, indeed, there is little evidence that antitakeover statutes affect incorporation
decisions. See Daines, Incorporation Choices, supra note 13, at 1597.
51 See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 15, at 703 (noting that "[e]ven laws not driven
by a specific company or a specific bid were intended to protect local companies from
takeovers generally").
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would have been maximized by allowing such takeovers to proceed and who
often opposed such antitakeover measures when they have a chance to vote
on them.52 Rather, the managers were trying to protect the corporate bastion
and their own salaries and perquisites. This is not truly an example of state
corporate law competition in the sense theorized by advocates, 53 but the
actions of the managers were consistent with race-to-the-bottom reasoning. 54
As Bebchuk has noted: "If antitakeover measures are inefficient, then
[race-to-the-top] logic predicts that states will not adopt them. Nonetheless,
states have done so overwhelmingly. This divergence between the theory's
prediction and the actual practice of states has not gone unnoticed. ' 55 Indeed,
52 In the last decade, shareholders have generally voted to eliminate takeover
defenses when they had a chance to vote on the issue. See Michael Klausner, Institutional
Shareholders' Split Personality on Corporate Governance: Active in Proxies, Passive in
IPOs (Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Prog. in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 225,
2001), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=292083.
53 If this is an example of state competition, then it is clear that states with
antitakeover statutes have won it. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence
Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1820 (2002) ("[T]he
empirical evidence does not establish that state competition rewards moderate takeover
regimes rather than the amassing of antitakeover statutes."); Guhan Subramanian, The
Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the "Race"
Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1872 (2002)
[hereinafter Subramanian, Influence] (reporting an empirical study of new incorporations
and reincorporations and finding, consistent with a race-to-the-bottom view, that
"managers generally migrate to (and fail to migrate away from) the typical state
antitakeover statutes").
54 Although I am not as enamored of the monitoring value of hostile takeovers as
most corporate commentators sympathetic with Professor Romano's views, it is
important to note that those in her camp criticize state regulation of takeovers as
providing a haven for inefficient and fraudulent managers inconsistent with the best
interests of shareholders. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to
Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 49-50
(2002). While the strongest argument in favor of takeover defenses has been that they
enable target management to negotiate with the acquirer for a higher premium, that
theory recently has taken a substantial hit. See Robert Daimes & Michael Klausner, Do
IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protections in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 83, 86 (2001) (finding that IPO entrepreneurs do not add takeover defenses for the
purpose of extracting a higher premium in the eventual sale of a company); Guhan
Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 621 (2003)
[hereinafter Subramanian, Bargaining] (noting theoretical evidence, empirical evidence,
and statements of belief from leading practitioners that poison pills, staggered boards, and
other takeover defenses raise premiums significantly in only a small subset of takeovers).
55 Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note 11, at 1446.
Subramanian agrees, noting that "the large-sample evidence shows that managers are
able to pursue private benefits of control by moving to states with [antitakeover] statutes.
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even some proponents of the race-to-the-top theory concede that behavior in
this realm contradicts their essential argument. 56 It is inconsistent to advocate
for both an open market for corporate control and state regulatory
competition, as many have done. 57
b. Officer Liability Protection
After Smith v. Van Gorkom seemingly created a real possibility that
directors could be held personally liable for their delicts, 58 officers and
directors demanded protection from accountability to shareholders to whom
they owed a fiduciary duty, and state legislatures quickly acceded to those
demands. 59 Romano cites these laws as an example of regulatory
competition. 60 To the extent that it constitutes competition, a clear signal
regarding the direction of this round of legislative changes is that states
allowed shareholders to adopt, but not to rescind, corporate provisions to
insulate directors from liability for breaches of their fiduciary duty.61
Delaware led the way in protecting managers, and it has been argued that the
reason Delaware continues to dominate the provision of corporate law is that
States, in turn, can be expected to (and do) cater to this interest." Subramanian, Influence,
supra note 53, at 1873.
In a recent study, Kahan found no significant evidence that antitakeover statutes
attracted incorporations, but did find evidence that provisions allowing managers to
minimize shareholder approval needed for mergers, minimize director liability, and
eliminate cumulative voting do. Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law:
Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection? 33 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 04-017, June 2004) available at http://ssm.com/abstract=557869.
Although he does not read it that way, Kamar admits that a plausible interpretation is that
these results evidence a race to the bottom. Id. at 34. See also Barzuza, supra note 32, at
135 ("[I]t has been shown that among states other than Delaware, those that adopt
stronger antitakeover protections are more successful in retaining incorporations than
states that adopt weaker ones.").
56 See Winter, supra note 9, at 287-89.
57 See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 388.
58 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
59 See Sean J. Griffith, The Good Faith Thaumatrope: A Model of Rhetoric in
Corporate Law Jurisprudence 74 (Dec. 17, 2004) (unpublished working paper), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=-571121 (noting that the Delaware legislature's effective
overruling of the Delaware Supreme Court's attempt to impose some accountability on
directors in Smith v. Van Gorkom "fits nicely with the standard political economy account
of Delaware corporate law: legislators are sensitive to changes in the law that might cause
corporations to leave and, when they can be persuaded that the courts have made such a
change, are apt to change it back").
60 Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 48, at 2392.
61 See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REv. 859, 866 (2003).
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it has been "the state where managers turned for assurances of minimal
exposure to personal liability for mistakes, misjudgments, wrongdoing, or
self-dealing." 62
Because other public company constituencies (shareholders, employees,
customers, bondholders, local communities) are mostly located outside
Delaware, the managers of public companies incorporated there have a 'much
stronger voice when lobbying for their interests. 63 That is likely to be the
case in any jurisdiction that competes for incorporations. It is telling that the
only other jurisdictions that one may plausibly argue have even lightly
competed for incorporations with Delaware lately, Nevada and Maryland,
have done so on the basis of advertising to managers their minimal disclosure
requirements, their liability shields, and their minimizing of shareholder
voice.64
As Professor Choi recently queried:
How can we advocate for greater choice in regulatory protection when self-
interested managers abuse the limited choice presently available to them?
The same impulses that may lead managers to corrupt analysts and auditors
through the provision of consulting and investment banking services may
also lead managers to opt for progressively weaker investor protection if
given the ability to select the governing corporate and securities legal
regime.6
5
62 Jones, supra note 23, at 646. See also JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
CORPORATIONS 97 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that managers desiring "a sympathetic and
experienced ear to the problems of running a public corporation, are assured of finding it
in Delaware").
63 See Brett McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP. L.
99, 136 (2004) [hereinafter McDonnell, Two Cheers] ("[A]t the state [law] level, these
other corporate constituencies are probably at the greatest disadvantage in Delaware.").
64 Id. at 109-10 (citing sources indicating that Nevada touts its minimal reporting,
minimal disclosure, and greater liability protection for investors, while Maryland focuses
on mutual funds, waiving annual shareholder meeting requirements, and giving boards
power to issue more shares without shareholder approval).
65 Stephen J. Choi, Channeling Competition in the Global Securities Market, 16
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 111, 112 (2002). Bratton and McCahery make the same point, noting
that the race-to-the-top regulatory competition model
depends on the heroic assumption [that] shareholder and manager interests always
are perfectly aligned, rendering irrelevant the mandated agenda control managers
enjoy under the state system. Where, as with takeovers, interests do not stand
aligned, the state system displays a structural defect. Because the market forces a
state that actually competes to focus on the variables that influence incorporation
decisions, there follows a concern for management preferences rather than
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3. Empirical Evidence of Directionality
Regulatory competition advocates respond to all of this evidence by
citing studies indicating that corporations reincorporating in Delaware get a
positive market boost.66 However, those studies cannot tease out the impact
of substantive corporate law from network effects. 67 Obviously, the more
corporations that incorporate in Delaware, the more benefits flow to all that
incorporate there regardless of the quality of the substantive law.68 Indeed,
there is every possibility that network and learning effects could cause a
lock-in of inferior, inefficient law. 69 The methodological problems of these
studies,70 plus their failure to consider the possibility of increasing returns,
71
leave the evidence inconclusive.
Furthermore, the event studies upon which regulatory competition
advocates rely are simply predictions by investors that other investors will
shareholder value itself. Accordingly, nothing at the state level prevents suboptimal
accommodation of management preferences respecting ex post affiliation terms and
fiduciary standards.
Since the defect is intrinsic to the system, regulatory correction must occur at
the national level.
Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium, supra note 45, at 29.
66 RoMANO, ADVANTAGE, supra note 35, at 63-74.
67 See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985) (noting that network effects arise
when "the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good increases with the
number of other agents consuming the good").
68 See Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck Between Bottom and Top: State
Competition for Corporate Charters in the Presence of Network Effects, 31 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 681, 681 (2003) [hereinafter McDonnell, Stuck] (noting that "[t]he presence of a
variety of network effects may cause corporations to incorporate in a state which already
has taken the lead in the charter race, even if some other states might offer better
substantive law," but arguing in favor of state competition nonetheless).
69 See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts,
81 VA. L. REV. 757, 849-51 (1995).
70 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federal Intervention to Enhance
Shareholder Choice, 87 VA. L. REV. 993, 1003 n.24 (2001) (noting that the evidence upon
which Romano relies "cannot be reliably interpreted as favoring state competition");
McDonnell, Stuck, supra note 68, at 710-11 (noting numerous problems that events
studies have in taking into account the effect of factors other than those being tested).
71 Even if Delaware has nonoptimal substantive law or even law worse than that of
some or most other jurisdictions, its more experienced judges, greater predictability, and
general network effect benefits that stem from its dominant position mean that "positive
returns to shareholders from incorporation in Delaware [are] quite consistent with the
race to the bottom thesis combined with the presence of increasing returns." McDonnell,
Stuck, supra note 68, at 711.
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react positively to the move to Delaware, whereas studies that look at the
actual economic performance of firms once they reincorporate in Delaware
tend not to show improvement. 72 And more recent studies show that even the
so-called "Delaware effect" on stock price disappears when examined over
time, especially for larger firms. 73
Additionally, the emerging field of behavioral finance 74 should make one
pause before accepting the assumption that higher initial share prices
automatically signal more shareholder value.75 The broad evidence that
markets are not as efficient as once believed and that investors often act
irrationally calls into question any evidence based simply on stock price.
Herd behavior 76 likely causes many firms to incorporate in Delaware. 77
72 See, e.g., Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in
the Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. & EcON. 179, 188 (1985) (finding no performance
advantage to corporations in Delaware); Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate
Governance, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 277, 322-23 (1996) (finding no improvement in
accounting performance upon reincorporation in Delaware); Jianghong Wang,
Performance of Reincorporated Firms (Nov. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Yale School of Management), cited in ROMANO, ADVANTAGE, supra note 35, at 221
nn.41, 42.
73 See Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 32, 57 (2004) [hereinafter Subramanian, Disappearing Delaware] (finding that
small Delaware firms were worth more than small non-Delaware firms during the period
1991-1996, but not afterward, and that larger firms-ninety-eight percent of the
sample-exhibited no "Delaware Effect" for any year from 1991 to 2002). Subramanian
is refuting an earlier study done by Daies. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law
Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001).
74 See Malcolm Baker et al., Behavioral Corporate Finance: A Survey (Oct. 9, 2004)
(unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract--602902 (containing a
recent, lengthy survey of the field); see also HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR:
UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING (2000);
ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
(2000); ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000); RICHARD H. THALER,
QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991); LARS TVEDE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FINANCE
(1999).
75 See generally Lynn A. Stout, Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good
Corporate Law (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Paper Series, Paper No. 05-7, 2005),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-660622 (emphasizing inefficiencies in the market
and the misleading nature of share price as a guide to production of true economic value).
76 Herd behavior occurs when people decide to do things largely because others are
doing them, not because they have put any independent thought into the decision. Herd
behavior influences actions in a wide variety of settings. See, e.g., Hayagreeva Rao et al.,
Fool's Gold. Social Proof in the Initiation and Abandonment of Coverage by Wall Street
Analysts, 46 ADMIN. SCi. Q. 502, 521 (2001) (finding herd behavior in research
departments of investment banks).
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Because this popular choice seems safe, it "pleases uninformed shareholders
who assume it is correct, and produces no adverse reaction from a
marketplace that cannot easily evaluate legal differences and so prefers the
consensus choice." 78
The decline in merit regulation by the states in recent years is consistent
with a race to the bottom,79 as is the trend, especially in Delaware, to give
managers more and more leeway to freeze out minority shareholders without
paying fair compensation in freezeout transactions.
80
The most insightful way to look at state competition may be to focus on
what states have not done. Most importantly, they have never required
meaningful disclosure to shareholders. 81 Despite the indisputable benefits of
corporate disclosure for the firm, shareholders, and potential shareholders,
before the federal securities laws were adopted, the states' disclosure
requirements for corporations were paltry, probably because of a fear that if
77 See Coffee, Future as History, supra note 5, at 703 (noting that companies may
incorporate in a popular jurisdiction "for reasons that are simply based on its popularity,
not the inherent superiority of its law"); Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of
Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for (Cognitive) Skepticism 34-35 (Fla. St. Univ. Coll.
of Law, Working Paper No. 129, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=600041
(noting additional factors such as information cascades that can cause firms to select a
body of law even though it is not the most efficient).
78 Coffee, Future as History, supra note 5, at 703.
In a situation of uncertainty, decision-makers strongly prefer to conform to that
which they perceive to be the most common position or the status quo. See generally
Robert A. Prentice, Teaching Ethics, Heuristics, and Biases, 1 J. Bus. ETHICS EDUC. 57,
59-60 (2004) (noting how status quo bias and conformity bias [("social proof')] can
impact decision makers).
79 See James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1200, 1243 (1999) (suggesting that the fact that an issuer denied a permit to sell
securities in State A could move to State B prompts State A to suffer a weakening resolve
to aggressively enforce disclosure regulations).
80 See Jason M. Quintana, Going Private Transactions: Delaware's Race to the
Bottom, 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 547, 598 (noting that "Delaware is leading the race to
the bottom" in its going-private jurisprudence). See also Bradley R. Aronstam et al.,
Delaware 's Going-Private Dilemma: Fostering Protections for Minority Shareholders in
the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal Exploration, 58 Bus. LAW. 519, 557 (2003) (noting that
current Delaware cases "leave minority shareholders with inadequate fairness protections
in going private transactions").
81 See Thompson & Sale, supra note 61, at 867 (noting that "[m]ost state corporation
statutes impose few mandatory disclosure obligations"). Delaware, for example, does not
require any information be delivered to shareholders except under traditional shareholder
inspection statutes, and does not provide what information corporations should preserve
for inspection. Id.
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they required meaningful disclosure, corporations might move to other states
that did not. 82
Additionally, as Mark Roe has pointed out, among other things that most
states have not done are: (a) remedy abuses in the solicitation of proxies,
(b) allow meaningful access to shareholder lists, (c) prohibit bundling of
shareholder proposals so that management could not package entrenchment
proposals with special dividend proposals that shareholders were sure to
support, (d) ban insider trading, (e) impose meaningful fiduciary duties upon
officers and directors, (f) provide meaningful remedies for minority
shareholders in going-private transactions, (g) require equal treatment of
shareholders in takeovers, and (h) ban dual-class recapitalizations. 83 In all of
these areas, federal regulation was required to advance shareholder interests
and to impose meaningful accountability on corporate managers, because the
states would not step up to the plate. 84 If state regulatory competition played
any role in this process, it was to exert a downward influence. 85
Simply put, Delaware has no meaningful competition from any other
state and to the extent that some minor state competition exists, it pulls
Delaware down and not up. 86 Overall, "Delaware's pro-managerial bias has
82 Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REv. 588, 611 (2003)
("[T]he states generally required no information to be disseminated, seeing the annual
election as sufficient to induce incumbents to give out information sua sponte-although
in practice, little information was sent out.").
83 Id. at 611-626.
84 Before Sarbanes-Oxley outlawed loans from public companies to their top
officers, in response to several egregious abuses, Delaware had "one of the most
permissive statutes" allowing such loans. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
the Making of Quack Corporate Governance 87 (ECGI Finance Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 52, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=596 101.
85 Delaware does not, except in unusual circumstances, require any disclosure to
shareholders, mandate independent directors, or provide for monitoring by independent
accountants. Instead, "Delaware has abandoned most legal controls on the manager's
duty of care, again leaving that to private ordering." Thompson & Sale, supra note 61, at
868.
8 6 See ROGER LOWENSTEiN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE AND ITS
UNDOING 87 (2004) (noting that "[i]n practice, Delaware, Nevada, and the rest competed
to see which could write the most notoriously lenient rules.. ."); Subramanian,
Disappearing Delaware, supra note 73, at 32 ("The trajectory of the Delaware effect
further suggests that it cannot provide support for the 'race to the top' view of regulatory
competition, as some commentators have argued, and may in fact provide support for the
'race to the bottom' view."); Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and
Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors'Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CAL.
L. REv. 551, 603 (1987) (finding in evidence of investors' lack of reaction to Delaware
court decisions regarding corporate law evidence "cast[ing] considerable doubt on
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increased in tandem with the increase in its market power."8 7 The body of
corporate law enacted by Delaware simply does not track with predictions of
race-to-the-top theory.88
The primary force preventing Delaware from being even more
consistently pro-manager than it has been is federal regulatory competition
from Congress and the SEC. 89 Since 1933, the federal government has
generally played the "bad cop" regarding manager wrongdoing, reining in via
disclosure requirements, insider trading bans, and fraud prohibitions, the
abuses that have been enabled by consistently more pro-manager state
corporate law. 90 A key reason why Delaware does from time to time raise its
standards is a realistic fear that if it does not do so, the federal government
will step in via congressional or SEC action.91 Mark Roe has observed the
strong correlation between a threat of federal preemption and Delaware's
corporate law jurisprudence. 92 A prominent Delaware attorney admitted in
1988 that Delaware had to moderate its antitakeover law in order to avoid
Winter's claim that investors' decisions concerning whether to buy the stock of Delaware
or non-Delaware companies operate so as to preclude the development of unduly pro-
manager systems of corporate law").
87 Barzuza, supra note 32, at 197.
88 Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to the
Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 381, 398-99 (2005).
89 Another factor that should not be ignored is the embarrassment that Delaware
courts have felt for being known as the "management can do what it wants" jurisdiction,
in an era in which everyone is painfully aware of management abuses in Enron, Global
Crossing, Tyco, etc. See Amy Borrus, Less Laissez-Faire in Delaware?, BUS. WK., Mar.
22, 2004, at 80 (quoting Professor Charles M. Elson).
90 See Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium, supra note 45, at 5-6.
91 See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation 36 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 259, 2004), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-600709 (noting that "corporate governance issues that the
federal government believes were not adequately handled by the states will likely find
their way into securities regulation"); Marc Gunther, Boards Beware!, FORTUNE, Nov.
10, 2003, at 171 (noting that after Enron, if Delaware "was perceived to be doing a less-
than-rigorous job of protecting shareholders, the federal government might take more
responsibility for corporate law, thereby eroding Delaware's power"); Subramanian,
Bargaining, supra note 54, at 681-82 (noting that, in every post-Sarbanes-Oxley case
involving directors' fiduciary duties, the Delaware courts had ruled to protect
shareholders, and observing that this trend "is unlikely to be coincidental"). As William
Allen, former Delaware Chancery Court judge recently admitted, "[i]t would not be
unreasonable to assume that the Delaware courts are responding to the Enron and
WorldCom headlines and the intrusion, so to speak, of the federal government into the
internal governance of corporations." Gunther, supra, at 177.
92 See Roe, supra note 82, at 645; Jones, supra note 23, at 663 ("There is reason to
suspect that if the federal threat recedes, Delaware will revert to its more lax
jurisprudence.").
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federal preemption. 93 More recently, Delaware judges have openly discussed
the path that Delaware law must take in the post-Enron era to avoid even
more incursion upon state authority than Sarbanes-Oxley already
represents. 94  Ultimately, a powerful SEC, which many regulatory
competition advocates would like to eviscerate, stands as the key force
preventing the race to the bottom from accelerating. 95
A final point, of course, is that the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 96
completely changes the debate by federalizing much of corporate law. It
solidifies the argument that Roe had already made that state regulatory
competition does not explain American corporate law; rather "the
fundamental inter-governmental relationship in making American corporate
law is that between Congress and Delaware, not that between Delaware and
other states."'9 7
Sarbanes-Oxley illustrates what Bratton and McCahery describe as a
comfortable equilibrium that has evolved over the past century.98 In this
equilibrium, "[w]hen a problem with national market implications arises, all
parties expect the national system to address it." 99 Because increasingly our
economic problems do have national implications, all parties are accustomed
to a larger federal role. They recognize its necessity and they welcome it.
Therefore, the debate for the immediate future should be whether specific
SOX provisions produced good or ill, not whether the Feds should have
ignored the Enron scandal and left corporation law to imaginary state
regulatory competition.
93 Roe, supra note 82, at 605 (quoting A. Gilchrist Sparks III, chair of the Delaware
Bar Association Corporate Law Council).
94 See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the
American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of
One Small State 24 (NYU Ctr. for Law & Bus. Research, Working Paper No. 03-01;
Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 03-03, 2003), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=367720.
95 See Griffith, supra note 59, at 66-67 (noting that scandals bring the threat of
federal intervention, which can cause Delaware judges to increase management
accountability, but when federal intervention is not a threat, corporate interest groups
usually secure less judicial intervention and more deference to boards).
96 Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
97 Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics 40 (Nov. 22, 2004) (unpublished working
paper), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/workshop-papers/roe.pdf"
98 Bratton & McCahery, Equilibrium, supra note 45, at 1.
9 9 1d. at 12.
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III. STATE SECURITIES LAW COMPETITION
Advocates for race-to-the-top state corporate law competition have
naturally taken the next logical step in their belief system by recommending
that America's strong SEC model be replaced by state securities law
competition. 100  They argue for a "market approach to securities
regulation,... [which] takes as its paradigm the successful experience of the
U.S. states in corporate law, in which the fifty states and the District of
Columbia compete for the business of corporate charters."''
1
A. No Meaningful State Securities Law Competition Exists
If state competition for corporate charters via corporate regulation is
largely a myth, then state competition for securities law is likely to be
equally fanciful. State legislatures have long been the dominant players in
corporate law, yet they do not meaningfully compete there. How much less
likely is it that they will compete in the realm of securities regulation where
they have less experience and interest, where they have been only marginal
players for at least seventy years, 10 2 and where there is no obvious motive to
100 The regulatory competition theory has been extended from corporation law to
other areas as well, including (a) environmental law, see, e.g., Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale
for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1210 (1992);
(b) bankruptcy law, see, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate
Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 474 (1994); and (c) family law,
see, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives
to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1995).
In at least some of these areas, the evidence seems to indicate strongly that the race
is toward the bottom. See, e.g., WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO
OWN ONE: How CORPORATE EXECUTIVES AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE S&L INDUSTRY
35, 225 (2005) (demonstrating that during the Savings and Loan debacle of the 1980s,
there was a race to the bottom among states regulating S&Ls and that most of the worst
frauds were clustered in states that had deregulated the most because they attracted the
most dishonest operators); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to
the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1114 (2000) ("[I]f individual jurisdictions are
free to compete for trust business by offering attractive packages of trust law provisions,
many of them will have incentives to adopt inefficient, externality-generating trust law
rules.").
101 Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 48, at 2361. Professor Romano also
extends this theoretical argument to the international securities arena, as evaluated in the
next section.
102 See ROMANO, ADVANTAGE, supra note 35, at 2 ("[Flederal securities law has
occupied the securities field and.., state law development has been marginal.").
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induce foreign corporations to choose their body of securities law? Why,
pray tell, would Texas, for example, desire that a California corporation
choose Texas law to govern transactions in its securities?
Even if Texas did have such a desire, its securities board had a budget of
only $3.45 million in 1999.103 This amount would be unlikely to enable the
Texas State Board of Securities to promulgate innovative rules and
regulations, to investigate large-scale frauds, or to effectively prosecute
schemes spread across state and national borders on anything but a sporadic
basis. The SEC's large, coordinated antifraud enforcement organization is
necessarily more efficient and effective than those of the fifty states. 104
And consider this Catch-22. If under a hypothetical system of state
regulatory competition, firms often changed bodies of securities law, then
investors would never be able to rely upon on any rules. They might discount
the shares of a company to account for a particular regulatory regime, only to
have the company switch to a much less efficient regime. 105
More likely, because companies seldom reincorporate, in a regime of
issuer choice, firms will change securities laws only infrequently. Therefore,
states would not attract meaningful numbers of companies by developing
innovative or efficient law. If companies change securities regimes only
infrequently, then they will continue to live under a regulatory monopolist of
the type that regulatory competition advocates decry the SEC for being. Is it
reasonable to believe that the securities agencies of Oklahoma or Arkansas
will make fewer regulatory mistakes than the SEC? 106
103 TEXAS STATE SECURITIES BOARD, SELF-EVALUATION REPORT 13 (1999),
available at http://www.sunset.state.tx.us/77threports/ssbSER.pdf.
104 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 23, at 609-10 ("[A] federal regulator
would have, and be willing to devote, more resources for developing and implementing
legal rules that would enhance shareholder wealth in publicly traded companies.").
105 Greenwood, supra note 88, at 401 ("[I]f managers can change the state of
incorporation pretty much at will, we are back in a market for lemons.").
106 Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction in
International Securities Regulation 22 (Dec. 9, 1999) (unpublished working paper),
available at http://ssm.con/abstract=193688 ("Romano fails to muster any evidence to
support her claim that competing regulators would make fewer mistakes than a
monopolistic regulator.").. Having all of the states (and nations in other regulatory
competition models) working on securities law provides lots more monkeys banging on
lots more typewriters, but whether it realistically moves the system closer to production
of the next Hamlet is questionable.
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B. Race to the Bottom
Because there is no current state regulatory competition to provide new
securities law, there is little independent evidence regarding whether, if such
a race developed, it would be a race to the top or a race to the bottom. The
same evidence and arguments that apply to state corporate law competition
would seem to apply equally here, though, and therefore suggest that such a
contest would be leisurely and southerly.
Because there is little specific evidence of the directionality of this
nonexistent race, consider this thought experiment. If we are really serious
about stimulating regulatory competition for securities law, consider creating
forty-nine more SECs. The current SEC will be known as SEC 1. The others
will be known as SEC2 through SEC50. Each of the fifty agencies will have
its own head and its own staff. Each will be charged with working
independently to come up with the best possible set of securities regulations.
Companies can opt into the rules and regulations of any of the fifty SECs. To
give the fifty SECs' employees an incentive to be inventive, creative, and
perspicacious, a twenty-five percent salary bonus will begranted at year's
end to the employees of the SEC attracting the most firms.
Because the federal government has more resources, 10 7 both in terms of
money and in terms of access to experienced personnel, 10 8 its fifty agencies
should be able to perform better than the folks in Kansas and South Dakota
who have few fiscal resources 10 9 and relatively few employees with
sophisticated securities experience. The fifty agencies can also share a
common enforcement mechanism which should be more efficient and cost
effective than the fifty different enforcement arms that the states will have to
utilize.
107 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 23, at 609-10 ("The resources used [for
developing and implementing legal rules] are an order of magnitude larger than those
devoted by states for such purposes.").
108 Although I would choose differently, I take it as a given that most experienced
securities attorneys would rather live in the Washington D.C. area than in Topeka or
Pierre.
109THE GOVERNOR'S BUDGET REPORT VOLUME 1: DESCRIPTIONS AND BUDGET
SCHEDULES, FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 59 (2005), available at
http://da.state.ks.us/budget/publications/FY2006/FY2006_GBR--Volume_ .pdf
(indicating that the budget for the Office of the Kansas Securities Commissioner in 2006
was $2.48 million).
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Although this plan is arguably superior to state competition, it is
obviously goofy. " 0 Rather than try it, or state competition, a better plan is to
work to ensure that the SEC is doing the best job possible."I '
Eliot Spitzer notwithstanding, any suggestions that a national agency is
not needed to prevent securities fraud and that the states can manage just fine
on their own,1 12 are dubious. No state securities regulator would support that
notion, any more than state attorneys general would suggest that the FBI be
disbanded. Supporters of regulatory competition have attempted to argue that
the states were doing just fine in policing securities fraud before the federal
acts were passed, noting that Benston found scant evidence of fraudulent
financial statements before the 1934 Act.11 3 However, Benston's conclusion
has been thoroughly debunked by Seligman, who has noted:
Benston's suggestion that there was little securities fraud before 1934 was
ludicrous. His "search of the available literature" apparently did not lead
him to read of a single enforcement action brought by any of the forty-seven
states that enacted blue sky securities regulation laws between 1911 and
1933. Yet in the year 1932, the State of New York alone secured injunctions
against 1522 persons and firms and instituted 146 criminal proceedings.'
1 4
110 It is no sillier than taking regulatory competition to its logical, reductio ad
absurdum, conclusion of authorizing each county in every state to offer a corporate law
or securities law regime. With that many more monkeys pounding on that many more
typewriters, who knows what innovations might arise?
111 Although regulatory competition between enforcement agencies, such as Eliot
Spitzer's New York Attorney General's office and the SEC can occasionally spur more
effective enforcement, such competition is more often likely to lead to wasted resources
and inconsistent enforcement. See Cary Coglianese et al., The Role of Government in
Corporate Governance 21 (Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Working
Paper No. RWP04-045, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=613421.
112 ROMANO, ADVANTAGE, supra note 35, at 43.
113 Id. at44.
1 14 JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 564-65 (rev. ed.
1995); see also Robert L. Smitley, Checkmating the Stock Swindler, 22 MAG. OF WALL
ST., Aug. 3, 1918, at 626 (noting "wildcat enterprises" that are "sheer swindles" costing
investors $200 million each year); Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable
Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 725,
735 (2003) (noting that after the Panic of 1907, "[t]he Pujo Committee also discovered
numerous abuses in the securities markets, including insider trading"); Richard D.
Wyckoff, The Remedy That Will End the Bucket Shop Evil, 29 MAG. OF WALL ST., JAN. 7,
1922, at 301 (noting widespread problems of bucket shops that were costing the public
"millions" and the NYSE's "half-hearted attempts" to stop them); Eliminating the
Financial Fakirs, 21 MAG. OF WALL ST., Mar. 30, 1918, at 924 (noting the indictment of
the principals of several hundred stock gambling corporations that had fleeced investors
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Market manipulation 1 5 and conflicts of interest (situations where
insiders could benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders)
were widespread in corporations in the early twentieth century.116
IV. INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW COMPETITION
Advocates of regulatory competition have extended the logic of state
securities law competition to the international realm by proposing
multinational securities law competition. 117 Why should a U.S. company not
be able to choose to be governed by the securities laws of France? Or
Uruguay? Or Botswana? As noted earlier, Professor Romano and Professors
Choi and Guzman envision companies being able to choose to be governed
by the laws of countries that provide for much, little, or no disclosure; much,
little, or no fraud protection; and many, few, or no corporate governance
rules. Whereas Romano generally posits a sprint to the top, Choi and
Guzman admit that some issuers may choose regimes of little or no fraud
protection for investors, but suggest that investors, being "rational and
out of $10 million); Are the Bucket Shops Coming Back?, 34 MAG. OF WALL ST., June
21, 1924, at 259 (noting that the New York District Attorney had secured forty-seven
convictions in bucket shop cases and had nearly as many cases still pending).
115 Paul Mahoney has done an empirical study purportedly demonstrating that stock
pools did not affect trading in the stock markets before the '34 Act was passed. See Paul
G. Mahoney, The Stock Pools and the Securities Exchange Act, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 343, 367
(1999). This may be true, but would come as quite a surprise to the Wall Street
professionals who repeatedly observed the impact of such pools at the time. See
generally, Scribner Browne, How to Detect Pool Operations in Stocks: Practical Hints by
an Experienced Trader, 19 MAG. OF WALL ST., Oct. 14, 1916, at 4 (describing how pools
work and giving examples); Weldon Chase, A Pool That Failed, 34 MAG. OF WALL ST.,
Sept. 27, 1924, at 846-47 (giving example of a major pool manipulation that raised
shares of Colorado Fuel & Iron common stock from $30/share to $50/share in short
order, but ultimately failed); John Durand, The Principles of Manipulation (pt. 2), 38
MAG. OF WALL ST., June 19, 1926, at 334 (explaining how pools and others manipulate
the stock market); Richard D. Wyckoff, The Insiders-The Pools--and The Public, 36
MAG. OF WALL ST., Sept. 12, 1925, at 883-84 (noting that "[o]n today's ticker tape there
are hundreds of footmarks of pools, manipulators, insiders, and victims..."); Points on
Market Manipulation, 34 MAG. OF WALL ST., June 7, 1924, at 175 (noting "instances of
gross and unjustifiable manipulation of securities" by pool operators and others and
giving examples).
116 Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Corporate Governance and the
Plight of Minority Shareholders in the United States Before the Great Depression (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research (NBER), Working Paper No. W10900, 2004), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=618582.
117 Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 387, 388 (2001); Romano, Empowering
Investors, supra note 48, at 2418-24; Choi & Guzman, Choice, infra note 249.
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informed," will simply discount what they are willing to pay for those
shares. 118
A. There Is No Meaningful International Competition
Because there is no evidence that states compete in a meaningful manner
by passing innovative corporate codes or innovative securities laws, it should
not be surprising that the evidence of international competition in securities
law is similarly weak. 1 9 European nations, for example, do not compete in
any meaningful way for incorporations, and all indications are that they are
unlikely to begin doing so any time soon. 120 There seems even less reason for
them to compete to provide securities regulation for foreign firms, because
there is no obvious way for them to earn significant amounts of revenue
doing so.
The situation regarding incorporations seems unlikely to change
significantly. If incorporations would generate so little income that they
provide no incentive for Montana or Wyoming to attempt to emulate
Delaware, it is difficult to see an incentive for Germany or Japan or even
Zimbabwe to do so. Indeed, Professor Tung ran the numbers and found that
the entire amount of securities fees paid worldwide would scarcely catch the
attention of the governments of the nations that can realistically provide the
machinery for meaningful securities regulation. 12 1 Furthermore, it is so easy
for German and Japanese investors to invest in American companies from
their home countries that no American companies need incorporate abroad to
raise funds.
Choice of law rules might stymie any such competition even if countries
were, against all reason, interested in competing. In the U.S., the internal
affairs doctrine is a choice of law rule that allows corporations to locate their
businesses anywhere, but have their internal affairs governed by the law of a
118 Stephen Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT'L
L. 815, 816 (2001) [hereinafter Choi, Issuer Choice].
119 There may be some international competition for incorporations, but it is
apparently even a lesser competition than that among the states. See Bratton &
McCahery, New Economics, supra note 8, at 266.
120 Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition for Incorporations 4-5 (NYU Law & Econ.,
Research Paper No. 05-01; Univ. of S. Cal. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 05-13;
ECGI Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 42, 2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-720121.
121 Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation: From U.S. Corporate Charter Competition
to Issuer Choice in International Securities Regulation, 39 GA. L. REV. 525, 590-91
(2005) [hereinafter Tung, Translation].
1180 [Vol. 66:1155
REGULATORY COMPETTION IN SECUR1TIES LAW
different state by incorporating in that other state. 122 In Europe and
elsewhere, however, the rule has traditionally been "that the law of the
corporation's main place of operations or business governs (the sikge social
[or 'real seat'] rule)."' 123 This rule makes it extremely unlikely that countries
around the world, even if they wished to create an international competitive
system of corporate law or securities regulation, could do SO. 12 4 Even
competition supporters admit that it would not be possible to create such a
competitive regime unless nations agree to alter completely their current
approach to securities regulation. 25 This would require negotiation of
treaties 126 of a type that have not been considered, and are unlikely to be.
Tung has observed that the "very incentives that would theoretically drive
national regulators to compete, if an international market for regulation
existed, would also make them unwilling to supply the choice of law rules
essential to creating that market in the first place, at least in important
jurisdictions."'127
Recently, three European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions held that the
real seat rule, as aggressively applied in the past by EU member states, is
incompatible with the Freedom of Establishment provision of the EC
Treaty. 128 These new decisions are unlikely to give rise to competitive
122 Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). The Court notes:
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that
only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs-
matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its
current officers, directors, and shareholders-because otherwise a corporation could
be faced with conflicting demands.
Id.
123 Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Convergence to Comity in Corporate Law:
Lessons from the Inauspicious Case of SOX 14 (Boston Coll. Law Sch., Pub. Law &
Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 24, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=462142.
124 Tung, Translation, supra note 121, at 561-81. Tung notes that without an
international consenus that each nation should honor private choice in securities
regulation, as American states do in the corporate law realm, jurisdictional competition
could not effectively occur. Id. at 542.
125 RoMANO, ADVANTAGE, supra note 35, at 150.
126 Id. (noting that international securities regulatory competition could come about
only if "effectuated by a treaty or other executive agreement approved at a higher
governmental level than securities agencies").
127 Tung, Monopolists, supra note 5, at 1369.
128 See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvers-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R.
1-1459, 2 C.M.L.R. 551 (1999); Case C-208/00, Uberseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co.
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securities regulation, however, for the roadblocks to jurisdictional
competition just within Europe (not to mention with nations from other
continents) remain formidable. 129 EU nations have evinced no interest in
beginning such a competition.
Even in the unlikely event that governments across the globe changed
their current practices and became interested in competing to provide
securities regulation, most corporations would do just as they do in the
U.S.-stay home. The reason is that their managers and attorneys, the driving
force behind making such a decision, would be reluctant to "forsake
significant learning and coordination benefits that have accrued with
territorial regulation."' 130 Given that investors prefer local stocks, 131 that the
price of cross-listed securities is typically dominated by activity on the home
country exchange, 132 and that local investors generally enjoy informational
advantages over foreign investors, the "hometown effect... guarantees the
regulatory monopolies that issuer choice proponents decry."'133
B. Race to the Bottom
With no significant international competition for incorporations or for
provisions of securities laws to study, conclusions must be tentative about the
direction such a race would take if it were to occur. However, just as the little
competition there is for incorporations in America tends toward the bottom
rather than the top, the same would likely happen if significant competition
ever came about in the international sphere. American companies
reincorporate in Bermuda to pay less tax, not more. Gambling operations
Baumanangement GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919; Case C-167/01, Kamer van
Koophandel en Farbrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155.
129 Jens C. Dammann, Freedom of Choice in European Corporate Law, 29 YALE J.
INT'L L. 477, 506-07 (2004). Although Dammann is a proponent of intra-European
regulatory competition, and remains optimistic that new EC rules could change things,
the picture he paints is discouraging, with major legal and practical barriers still in place.
Id. Dammann is addressing corporate law competition, but the specified roadblocks
would apply equally to securities law competition. See also Christian Kirchner et al.,
Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art: Unbundling Delaware's
Product for Europe 8 (Univ. of I11. Coll. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No.
LE04-001, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=617681 (noting that "the seat
theory may continue its de facto dominance").
130 Tung, Translation, supra note 121, at 536.
131 See Karen K. Lewis, Trying to Explain Home Bias in Equities and Consumption,
37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 571, 572 (1999) (explaining "home bias puzzle").
132 See Kenneth A. Froot & Emil M. Dabora, How Are Stock Prices Affected by the
Location of Trade?, 53 J. FIN. ECoN. 189, 190-91 (1999) (finding this phenomenon).
133 Tung, Translation, supra note 121, at 565.
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incorporate in the Bahamas to avoid regulation, not to embrace it. Companies
that choose to play the regulatory competition game might also have less
than honorable intentions.
As noted earlier, only small and very poor countries could be interested
in the revenue generated by such a system, and they would lack the capacity
to provide the legal system, expertise, and other elements necessary to for
meaningful regulation.134 If they actively entered a race to provide regulatory
alternatives, their most realistic avenue for doing so would be as a haven for
crooks.
Race-to-the-top logic is supported by the substantial evidence that
countries with higher disclosure requirements and more stringent corporate
governance rules provide an environment in which companies can raise more
money faster and cheaper. 135 Therefore, the theory goes, companies should
voluntarily flock to those countries which require more disclosure and better
governance as a way of "bonding" for investors. This should, in turn, prompt
nations to raise their standards to attract more and more companies.
Unfortunately, as with state corporate competition, reality does not accord
with theory.
For example, recently, firms from Eastern Europe flocked to Delaware to
form limited liability corporations under Delaware law. Were they doing it to
signal to shareholders that they were adopting standards to protect their best
interests? No, they were doing it because secrecy provisions in Delaware
laws allowed them to set up shell corporations as a means of laundering
money. These were criminal enterprises from Russia, the Ukraine, and
elsewhere doing what criminal enterprises do when regulation is lax. 136
Ireland recently had a similar race-to-the-bottom experience when it allowed
foreign companies to establish IRNRs (Irish nonresident companies). They
used those entities "to funnel hot money into tax-free havens and to hide the
identities of some investors." 137 These examples are not encouraging for the
future of international securities regulatory competition.
134 Tung, Translation, supra note 121, at 598-616.
135 See Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation?, supra note 2, at 1495-99 (citing
numerous studies).
136 See Glenn R. Simpson, Money-Laundering Investigators Flock to Delaware,
WALL. ST. J., Sept. 30, 2004, at A4.
137 See Nick Webb, Mexican Tycoon's Insider Dealing Probe Leads Back to
Ireland, SUNDAY INDEP. (Ireland), Feb. 29, 2004.
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IV. DOMESTIC STOCK EXCHANGE COMPETITION FOR LISTINGS
A. Existence of Competition
Stock markets do have a clear incentive to compete for listings. Unlike
most states (which seem to be largely indifferent to attracting incorporations
by out-of-state companies) and most nations (which seem similarly
indifferent to the opportunity to provide securities law regimes to foreign
firms), exchanges profit from trading volume and do desire to take listings
away from other exchanges, both domestic and foreign. Clearly the NYSE
wishes to take listings away from NASD, and vice versa. Both battle
electronic exchanges for market share. Competition is constrained by SEC
regulation, which shapes the possibilities for all of the market players.
B. Race to the Bottom
Absent SEC regulation, would the competition among exchanges create a
race toward the top or a race toward the bottom? Professor Mahoney argues
that it would be a race to the top because "[s]elf-interested stock exchange
members will produce rules that investors want for the same reasons that
self-interested bakers produce the kind of bread that consumers want." 138
Pritchard makes a similar argument: more fraud means less liquidity, less
liquidity means fewer trading commissions for broker-dealers, broker-dealers
hold a property right in exchanges, and, therefore, broker-dealers should be
incentivized to "push exchanges to enforce vigorously prohibitions against
fraud on the market." 139
Initially, it is not intuitively obvious why the NYSE, which cannot
protect itself from being ripped off to the tune of $180 million by its CEO, 140
should have the primary responsibility for policing fraud in the securities
markets. Frankly, the picture of entrepreneurial exchanges developing new
and efficient listing requirements that is painted by regulatory competition
advocates does not closely resemble the dominant exchanges' actual
138 Paul Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1459 (1997).
139 Adam C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions
with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 929 (1999)
[hereinafter Pritchard, Markets as Monitors].
140 See NYSE Chiefs Pay 'Out of Whack,' FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at 16 (noting
that the Webb Report on former CEO Richard Grasso's pay "paints a picture of a board
of directors ... that was not fully aware of what it had agreed to pay its chairman, or
why").
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practices. As Choi and Fisch have pointed out, the NYSE "is controlled by
member firms with a financial interest in retaining the existing structure." 141
Because securities exchanges have traditionally operated as membership-
driven organizations, they have generally "behaved more like sluggish
monopolies than dynamic entrepreneurs." 142
Furthermore, the assumption of substantial alignment between the
interests of the exchange and of the investors that they are to protect is faulty
on several levels. First, if, as is often the case, there is a conflict of interest
between the exchange's members and the listing company, the listing
company will often be sacrificed. An example is NYSE Rule 500, which,
until at least 1997, made it extremely difficult for a company to delist from
the exchange and go elsewhere. 143
Second, if, as is even more often the case, there is a conflict of interest
between the listing company's investors and its managers, exchanges know
that it is the managers who make the listing decision, so they will
accommodate the managers, who may want less monitoring more than the
investors want better governance.
Third, if, as frequently happens, the issuer and its managers have no
particular horse in the race, but there is a conflict of interest between the
NYSE members and investors, the NYSE will too often favor its
members. 144
A quick history of the NYSE makes the point that, in terms of disclosure
requirements, anti-fraud enforcement, and other issues important to investors,
exchanges are not even up to the task of self-regulation, let alone the task of
regulating the general securities markets.
141 See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher
Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 303 n. 159 (2003)
(suggesting that shareholders of NYSE companies who complain about methods of
counting votes in the current proxy system are not likely to find a sympathetic ear at the
exchange).
142 Coffee, Racing Towards the Top, supra note 5, at 1800 (noting that this is
beginning to change as various exchanges around the world demutualize).
143 Laura Nyantung Beny, U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of Current
Regulatory and Structural Issues and a Reform Proposal to Enhance Competition, 2002
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 399,463 n. 302 (explaining Rule 500).
144 Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation?, supra note 2, at 1435 (noting several
facets of this misalignment); see also JOHN S. GORDON, THE GREAT GAME: THE
EMERGENCE OF WALL STREET AS A WORLD POWER, 1653-2000, at 213 (1999) ("It is a law
of human nature that, absent outside pressure, organizations tend to evolve in ways that
favor their elites ... [F]ew better examples of this phenomenon exist than the New York
Stock Exchange in the 1920s.").
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1. Before 1933
Some have claimed that before federal regulation, exchanges attracted
listing companies by requiring them to disclose information that investors
would wish to know and by effectively fighting fraud by issuers that might
damage shareholders. This is an optimistic reading of history. Full disclosure
for shareholders did not exist before the 1933 and 1934 Acts were passed,
and prospectuses used at that time "were 'little more than notices.' ' 145
Only under pressure from the government did the NYSE slowly adopt
disclosure requirements, 146 and it generally failed to enforce them in any
vigorous way. As The Magazine of Wall Street reported at the time, "the
[NYSE] has permitted, or has been under the necessity of permitting, many
'listed' companies to continue on their way without any penalties being
imposed because of variously unsatisfactory financial statements." 147 The
NYSE's only meaningful penalty was delisting and, naturally, it shied away
from the attendant decrease in revenue that would follow if it actually
enforced its own disclosure rules. For that reason, although railroads and
145 Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the
Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 725, 733-34 (2003) (quoting
United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)).
146 See Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation
Around the World 28-29 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion
Paper No. 492, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-631221 (noting that the
NYSE resisted imposing any disclosure requirements, but finally commenced in a modest
way in 1910 under "intense governmental pressure").
147 Corporation Reports That Do Not Report!, 34 MAG. OF WALL ST., May 10,
1924, at 18. And these were not minor defects, the article noted:
The "defects" (for lack of a better term) contained in the reporting methods of
companies such as those enumerated include "disguising" earnings, by reason of
unexplained write-offs; "concealing" earnings, by failing to divulge the results
obtained by important subsidiaries; "distorting" earnings, particularly in quarterly
reports and by failing to make allowances in such reports for necessary reserves to
be written off inevitably, sooner or later; "inadequately describing earnings" by
publishing incomplete Income Accounts.
1d.; see also Matthew Josephson, Infrequent Corporation Reports Keep Investors in
Dark, 36 MAG. OF WALL ST., June 20, 1925, at 303 (noting that thirty percent of the
NYSE-listed companies were exempt from the exchange's disclosure requirements in any
event and that, among the other companies, "[t]here are too many instances in the present
market of important news being held up until accumulation by insiders is complete"); The
Time Has Come for Corporations to Recognize the Rights of Investors in the Matter of
Financial Reports!, 33 MAG. OF WALL ST., March 29, 1924, at 932 (noting that, despite
NYSE listing requirements, "all too great a proportion issue either too few reports or too
inadequate reports or reports that are misleading").
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utilities were required by government regulators to make regular reports of
their financial condition, "many well-known companies maintain the utmost
secrecy, either as a matter of tradition or on the grounds of competition."']48
Additionally, before there was an SEC, the NYSE was often rife with
fraud. 149 It and other exchanges were at the "epicenter of the manipulative
and speculative activity that led to the Crash of 1929,"150 and even after the
crash the NYSE refused to enact any reform measures of its own, forcing a
recalcitrant President Hoover to instigate a Senate investigation.151
2. 1933-2000
Supporters of a much broader and more important role for exchanges in
market regulation admit that exchanges have no incentive to stop
manipulation because manipulation usually inflates trading volume and
increases profits. 152 They claim, on the other hand, that exchanges do have a
motive to prevent fraud which would diminish trading. But there is also
evidence that they simply have the motive to hide such frauds as long as
possible. 153 Indeed, the very "efficacy of self-regulation was called into
148 Josephson, supra note 147, at 303 (quoting NYSE economist Edward Meeker).
149 See VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA 254 (1970) (noting
that during the 1920s, there "was a marked decline in [investment banking] judgment and
ethics and unscrupulous exploitation of public gullibility and avarice"); GORDON, supra
note 144, at 215 (noting that in light of pools, wash sales, bear raids, and the like, the
NYSE "was, at least for the quick-witted and financially courageous, a license to steal.
Whom they were stealing from in general, of course, was the investing public at large").
150 Onnig Hatchig Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling
Self-Regulation and the National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1074 (2005).
151 Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDozO L. REV. 909, 923 (1994).
152 Pritchard, Markets as Monitors, supra note 139, at 1003. See also Stephen C.
Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The Case of Market
Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141, 141 (1995) ("An examination of the history of self-
regulation at 10 exchanges [including the NYSE] prior to the passage of laws proscribing
manipulation shows that they took few, if any, measures to curb manipulation."); Stephen
C. Pirrong, The Efficient Scope of Private Transactions-Cost-Reducing Institutions: The
Successes and Failures of Commodity Exchanges, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 255 (1995)
(finding that exchanges often do not adopt optimal rules and that government intervention
can sometimes improve market efficiency).
153 See Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-Based Securities
Regulation, 83 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1518 (1997) ("[T]o the extent that an exchange believes
that, absent policing, certain violations are likely to remain undiscovered, its incentives to
engage in such policing are substantially reduced."); see also John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure,
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question by stock market abuses reported in the 1963 SEC Special
Study .... ,,154 Unsurprisingly given the incentives, the NYSE has long
earned a reputation of being reluctant to punish fraud among its members.' 55
NYSE proponents admit that many have criticized the NYSE for
maintaining fixed commissions at the expense of investors, 156 but maintain
that when the SEC passed rules to prohibit fixed commissions in 1975, this
was essentially a fait accompli because of decisions already made by the
Exchange. 157 However, the historical record indicates "that without a more
assertive SEC [which itself arrived belatedly], the New York Stock Exchange
was unwilling to design a commission-rate structure related to transaction
costs and that market forces alone were unable to evolve" competitive
brokerage rates. 158
Even after September 11, 1973, when the SEC announced that it would
end fixed commissions at the NYSE by May 1, 1975 if the NYSE did not do
so itself, the NYSE "steadfastly opposed" the SEC's decision.1 59 The
NYSE's board of governors passed a resolution opposing abolition of fixed
commissions unless the SEC shielded it from competition from third-market
25 J. CORP. L. 1, 32 (1999) ("[Because exchanges] profit on trading volume, and they
compete to list companies, they will not wish to delist an actively traded company, even
when it misbehaves badly. Similarly, their incentives to take enforcement action against
powerful broker-dealers also may be suboptimal.").
154 Roberta S. Karnel, Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and Implications of
Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 401 (2002)
(citing SEC, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95,.
pt. 4 (1st Sess. 1963)) [hereinafter Karmel, Demutualization].
155 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 68 n.254 (2001) (noting that
before the SEC came into existence, "the NYSE seldom, if ever, enforced its own
disciplinary rules"); SELIGMAN, supra note 114, at 11 (noting NYSE's reluctance to
answer FBI Director Hoover's call to take action against pool operators and bear raiders
in 1932); John E. Tracy & Alfred B. MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
32 MICH. L. REv. 1025, 1034-35 (1934) (noting that the Hughes Commission in 1907 had
"chided the New York Stock Exchange for its spirit of conservative camaraderie that
made members lax in punishing culpable fellow-members, with the result that
punishment, though swift, was only meted out after the horse, figuratively speaking, had
been stolen").
156 Pritchard, Markets as Monitors, supra note 139, at 1011-12.
157 Id. at 1012; see also Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, supra note 138, at
1494-95 (making the same point).
158 SELIGMAN, supra note 114, at 440.
159 Id. at 482; see also Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance
Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L. REv. 325, 351 (2001) [hereinafter Karmel, Future]
(noting the "determined efforts of the New York Stock Exchange in the 1963-1975
period to retain fixed commission rates").
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trading, its chairman threatened suit against the SEC, its lobbyists bottled up
securities bills in Congress because they contained provisions unfixing
commissions, and its witnesses who testified in front of Congress predicted
pretty much the end of life as we know it if fixed commissions were
banned. 160 To make this out as an NYSE initiative misreads the evidence.
Several years ago, Professor Jeffrey Gordon argued that companies
would list on the New York Stock Exchange (rather than AMEX and
NASDAQ) because of its tougher listing requirements, particularly its one-
share, one-vote listing rule. 161 His notion was that by committing to this
higher listing standard, firms would "bond a promise" to investors who
would be so impressed that they would pay more for the issuers' stock.
Unfortunately, when push came to shove, the weakness of exchanges as
regulators again was highlighted. General Motors wished to eliminate its
one-share, one-vote structure 162 and the NYSE was hardly in a position to
delist such a prominent company. 163 The NYSE did not wish to lose this
company to its competitor exchanges. 164 Investor protection gave way to
manager preference as the NYSE asked the SEC for permission to scrap its
single-class common stock rule. Only later, after five years of active
prodding by the SEC, did "the national markets.., agree on a rule that
protected shareholder interests." 165
In a similar vein, in the early 1990s, in an attempt to gain more foreign
listings, the NYSE urged that "world class" companies be exempted from all
160 SELIGMAN, supra note 114, at 83.
161 Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem
of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REv. 3,66-68 (1988).
162 The NYSE had adopted the rule in the face of political pressure stirred up by a
Harvard professor, William Z. Ripley, who met with President Coolidge about the matter.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 38 (2001) (noting that Ripley's
speech had received "wide press coverage" and that President Coolidge was "apparently
sympathetic" to Ripley's concerns).
163 Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542, 558 (1990) (citing Securities Exchange Act Release No.
24,623, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,665 (June 24, 1987)) (giving a history of the one share, one vote
rule).
164 Karmel, Future, supra note 159, at 345. See also Rock, infra note 184, at 699
(noting that the one-share, one-vote controversy "provides a cautionary lesson in the
tension between competition among suppliers of rules and the ability of any one supplier
to commit credibly to enforce its rules").
165 Amir N. Licht, Bonding and Dominance in Securities Markets: Cross-Listing
and Corporate Governance 23 (unpublished working paper, Nov. 26, 2002), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=367501.
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U.S. disclosure, accounting, and auditing standards. 166 This may or may not
have been a good idea, but it certainly contradicted the theory that the NYSE
would propose higher standards for foreign issuers so that those issuers could
bond their quality to the market.
Pritchard essentially concedes that when profits are nakedly at stake, the
exchanges will sacrifice investors, but hopes that in less conflicted settings
the NYSE will show more backbone in standing up to fraud and other actions
that threaten investor welfare. 167 But for the past seventy years the SEC has
provided most of the rigidity in the NYSE's spine. 168 Therefore, there is no
reason to believe that exchanges could ever serve as primary lawmakers for
securities regulation or as viable sole regulators.169
3. 2000-Present
Most pro-investor reforms that the NYSE has made over the years
simply would not have occurred absent government pressure and a motive to
buy off regulation. 170 Professor Thompson notes that "[t]he record of recent
listing changes.., suggests the NYSE responds more to a SEC push than to
demand from investors." 171 Consider the recent scandals that made the
names of securities analysts Henry Blodgett and Jack Grubman infamous. As
Professors Fisch and Sale have pointed out:
The NYSE and the NASD are run by, and primarily are accountable to,
their members, the brokerage firms. Given the importance of investment
166 Richard C. Breeden, Foreign Companies and U.S. Securities Markets in a Time
of Economic Transformation, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S77, S95 (1994).
167 Pritchard, Markets as Monitors, supra note 139, at 1014.
168 See Dombalagian, supra note 150, at 1082 (noting that throughout the 1970s and
1980s, the SEC pressured the NYSE and other exchanges to improve their listing
standards); Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing
Standards, State Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 977 (2003)
(making a similar point).
169 See DAVID P. MCCAFFREY & DAVID W. HART, WALL STREET POLICES ITSELF:
How SECURITIES FIRMS MANAGE THE LEGAL HAZARDS OF COMPETITIVE PRESSuREs 184
(1998) ("Blunt external regulation, private legal action, and political and economic
pressures produce some unsuitable outcomes and waste, but self-regulation does not work
effectively without them.").
170 See Karmel, Future, supra note 159, at 327 ("Historically, listing standards were
seen as a substitute for government regulation. The NYSE argued that if its listing
standards for securities offered for sale adequately protected the investing public, then
government regulation would be unnecessary.").
171 Thompson, supra note 168, at 975.
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banking business for member firms, it is unrealistic to expect the SROs
[(self-regulatory organizations)] actively to curtail a structure that promotes
these operations .... [B]rokerage firms often benefit more directly from
analysts' work through proprietary trading in covered securities. It is not
surprising, then, that the scope of the regulatory response by the SROs has
been limited and that the SROs have failed effectively to enforce even the
monitoring functions that they self-prescribed. The SROs have little reason
to disturb the status quo.172
Another recent example is the NYSE's failure to police widespread
illegal trading by floor brokers. 173 Even disastrously pro-industry SEC head
Harvey Pitt noted that exchanges such as the NYSE and NASDAQ were
reluctant to be the first to raise listing standards, "for fear of giving the other
a competitive advantage."' 174 And when NASDAQ created the BBX with the
notion of imposing corporate governance standards and enticing its premier
Bulletin Board companies to list, few signed up. The BBX was scrapped and
fraud continued to flourish on the OTC. 175
The influx of competition by new electronic exchanges has placed even
more downward pressure on the major exchanges. 176 Ultimately, "stock
exchanges are mostly concerned with their own survival and prosperity,"'
177
and when stringent listing requirements are inconsistent with those goals,
they may be quickly jettisoned.
Although theoretically exchanges can signal their quality by denying
listings to questionable companies, historically this has rarely occurred.
178
172 Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the
Regulation ofAnalysts, 88 IOWA L. REv. 1035, 1096 (2003).
173 See Susanne Craig & Laurie P. Cohen, SEC Takes Another Look at Grasso,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2003, at Cl 1 (quoting SEC report noting that investors were
shortchanged in trades involving two billion shares).
174 Albert B. Crenshaw, SEC to Toughen Rule on Option Plans, WASH. POST, Dec.
20, 2001, at El (citing Pitt).
175 Carrie Coolidge, Under the Counter, FORBES GLOBAL, Nov. 24, 2003, at 70
(noting that the filings with NASD "can very well be garbage").
176 See Coffee, Racing Towards the Top, supra note 5, at 1818 ("ECNs erode the
incentive for an exchange to invest in reputational capital or to maintain high listing
standards if the exchange cannot fully capture the trading in that security.").
177 Amir N. Licht, David's Dilemma: A Case Study of Securities Regulation in a
Small Open Market, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 673, 706 (2001) [hereinafter Licht,
David's Dilemma].
178 Karessa Cain, New Efforts to Strengthen Corporate Governance: Why Use SRO
Listing Standards?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 619, 651 (noting how infrequently
exchanges delist companies); CHARLES R. GEISST, DEALS OF THE CENTURY: WALL
STREET, MERGERS, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 21 (2004) (same).
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The General Motors episode illustrates why. While it has been argued that
"market participants... have a strong market incentive to correct failures...
[but] regulators ensconced with monopoly power lack any such incentive,"1 79
over and over again it has been the SEC and Congress, not the market
participants, that have cleaned up the market's messes.
The SEC has been criticized for tending to be reactive, creating new
rules only when crises come to the fore. This is a plausible criticism, 180 but
one may condemn the exchanges in much stronger terms. The NYSE and
NASD tend to enact reforms only after (a) crises occur, (b) they learn of the
crises, (c) outside entities learn of the crises and the exchanges' failure to do
anything about them, and (d) outside entities threaten to impose state or
federal regulation upon the exchanges unless they take action. 181
Even if stock exchanges wished to enforce disclosure and antifraud rules
vigorously, they would have difficulty doing So.82 As Romano notes,
government regulation (she prefers the state variety) "does... offer some
decided benefits over stock exchange regulation: a more effective mechanism
of private dispute resolution for securities suits against issuers, and a public
enforcement system, should the deterrent effect of criminal prosecution for
securities law violations be a necessary complement to civil liability. '183
Exchanges have a minimal arsenal of remedies and enforcement tools at their
179 Stephen J. Choi, A Framework for the Regulation of Securities Market
Intermediaries, 1 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1, 25 (2004).
180 The SEC is attempting to remedy its short-term focus. The SEC recently created
a fifteen-person Office of Risk Assessment with the responsibility of looking ahead to
attempt to spot problems before they become significant. See Adrian Michaels, The
Patience Behind the New-Look SEC, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2004, at 33 (interviewing Peter
Derby, head of the Office of Risk Assessment).
181 Although proponents of exchange-based regulation have no convincing response
to the evidence that exchanges avoid enforcing their own rules because it might create
bad publicity, they suggest that government regulators may also suppress evidence of
fraud in order to portray the markets within their jurisdiction as uncorrupted. Adam C.
Pritchard, Self-Regulation and Securities Markets, REGULATION, Spring 2003, at 32, 38
[hereinafter Pritchard, Self-Regulation]. But this response is not only inconsistent with
most of the history of the SEC, it is also inconsistent with the argument that
governmental agencies inevitably attempt to expand their own fiefdoms. See James A.
Fanto, The Absence of Cross-Cultural Communication: SEC Mandatory Disclosure and
Foreign Corporate Governance, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 119, 205 (1996) (suggesting
an SEC tendency to "safeguard its own importance").
182 See Dombalagian, supra note 150, at 1095 (noting how difficult it is for
exchanges, even if properly motivated, to punish systemic fraud or prosecute wrongdoing
that profits members); Gretchen Morgenson, Big Board Is Far From Forefront When It
Comes to Policing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at C1.
183 ROMANO, ADVANTAGE, supra note 35, at 145.
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disposal even if they wanted to stop fraud by listing companies. 184 Exchange-
based regulation would be greatly impeded because the exchanges' primary
mechanism for resolving disputes, arbitration, cannot accommodate class
actions. 185
Beyond this, exchanges impose listing requirements that typically
exclude large percentages of the very firms (a) that are most likely to commit
fraud, and (b) whose owners might profit from mandatory disclosure.186 Such
firms would not even be within the realm of an exchange-enforced system.
Ultimately, the federal securities acts worked because "enforcement by
the federal government was seen as more credible because it may have been
seen as less subject to capture by insiders on exchanges."' 187 In the pre-1933
era, the threat of state and particularly federal regulation forced the NYSE to
impose moderate levels of regulation upon its listing companies. Since 1933,
continuing SEC pressure has accounted for most of the pro-investor reforms
that the NYSE and other exchanges have adopted.' 88 Examples of reforms
made by the exchanges that were functionally mandated by the SEC range
184 Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment
Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDozo L. REv. 675,697 (2002) (noting numerous
limitations of the NYSE and other exchanges, especially an inability to impose criminal
sentences).
185 Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 48, at 2400. See also Erik Berglof &
Stijn Claessens, Corporate Governance and Enforcement 23 (World Bank Policy
Research, Working Paper No. 3409, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=625286 (noting that exchanges and
other SROs will need "some backing up from higher levels of government or from the
judicial system" to begin to effectively regulate).
186 Ferrell notes that "some exchanges require that a firm be profitable for a certain
number of years before they are even eligible for listing, exactly those firms that are least
likely to have internal sources of capital or well-established ties to financial institutions."
Ferrell, supra note 146, at 27.
187 See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE
CAPITALISTS 160 (2003). Certainly the SEC is also less likely to be captured than state
regulators in a system of regulatory competition. See Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra
note 11, at 1503 ("[T]here are some reasons to believe that the lobbying power of
manager interest groups relative to that of public shareholder interest groups is stronger
on the state level than on the federal level.").
188 When exchange standards match or exceed SEC standards, it is only because the
SEC has "encouraged" the exchanges. See Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions
Are Not Enough: The Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the
Economic Case for Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 223,
322 n.202; Helen S. Scott, The SEC, The Audit Committee Rules, and the Marketplaces:
Corporate Governance and the Future, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 549, 566 (2001) (noting the
SEC's prominent role in exchange-based corporate governance rules).
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from the 1977 requirement that listed companies have an audit committee
made up of independent members, 189 to the 1994 decision to reinstitute a
form of one-share, one-vote, 190 to a wide variety of corporate governance
reforms enacted in 2002.191 Just as the federal government is the main
countervailing power keeping Delaware from racing to the bottom in order to
prevent corporations from fleeing the state, so is the SEC the primary force
elevating the conduct of exchange-based regulation. If in either context
federal pressure were removed, the results would be unfortunate. 192
VI. INTERNATIONAL STOCK EXCHANGE COMPETITION
A. Existence of Competition
In the international and domestic spheres, stock exchanges seem to have
more incentive to compete for listings than nations do to compete for
incorporations or to provide securities regulation. However, when
DaimlerChrysler AG listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the NYSE
ended up with only five percent of the stock trading volume, which certainly
minimized its incentive to attract European and other international issuers. 193
This is consistent with experience, for "it has traditionally been tough for
new entrants to prise trading volume away from incumbents."'] 94
189 In 1977, the NYSE adopted a rule requiring listed domestic companies to have
an audit committee comprised solely of independent directors. "The voluntariness of the
NYSE's adoption of this rule was debatable." Karmel, Future, supra note 159, at 340.
190 See Richard A. Booth, The Uncertain Case for Regulating Program Trading,
1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 47 n.l 13 (1994) (noting the SEC's efforts); Rock, supra
note 184, at 699 ("The one-share, one-vote controversy-whatever one thinks about the
merits of the rule-provides a cautionary lesson in the tension between competition
among suppliers of rules and the ability of any one supplier to commit credibly to enforce
its rules.").
191 See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 86, at 89 (noting that the SEC is the primary mover
behind these listing changes); Thompson, supra note 168, at 977-81 (same).
192 See Franco, supra note 188, at 329 ("As disclosure regimes proliferate, all
issuers may in some sense be worse off because it will be more difficult to gauge the risk
of disclosure opportunism.").
193 See Andrew Karolyi, DaimlerChrysler AG, The First Truly Global Share 15
(Ohio State Univ. Dice Ctr., Working Paper No. 99-13, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract id= 185133.
194 Jeremy Grant, Eurex Prepares Launch of New US Exchange, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2004, at 22 (describing low expectations for Eurex, the European derivatives exchange,
in its attempt to take on the Chicago Board of Trade).
1194 [Vol. 66:1155
REGULATORY COMPETITON IN SECURITIES LAW
Not surprisingly, then, Professor Coffee recently noted that "[t]he history
of head-to-head inter-market competition among stock exchanges is
conspicuous by its absence."' 195 Furthermore, as the global securities market
becomes more technologically sophisticated, it is possible that fragmentation
will create a situation in which "no trading site will have enough incentive to
invest heavily in monitoring or enforcement, and the concept of listing as a
bonding device will begin to disappear."'196
As with the case for state regulatory competition in corporate codes and
securities law regulation, the relative absence of stiff competition among
international bourses does not bode well for proposed regulatory competition
regimes. However, recently there has been at least modest competition
among bourses in Frankfort, Paris, Scandanavia, London, and elsewhere with
those in America. If such competition were to grow in the future, in what
direction might it flow?
B. Race to the Bottom
European corporations often choose to list in New York (and in London),
even though they will have to disclose more information on those exchanges
than if they listed their shares elsewhere. One theory is that they are
"bonding" themselves to investors, signaling their strength and good
intentions. Although this is no doubt true for some issuers, generally foreign
companies do not go to the NYSE primarily because their managers desire to
disclose information, subject themselves to antifraud liability, and "bond"
themselves to investors. Rather, they go there for the same reason that Willie
Sutton used to go to banks-that's where the money is. 197 And that's where
the visibility is.
The bonding theory also minimizes the special concessions that the
exchanges 198 and the SEC have given to foreign listing companies. 199 If
195 Coffee, Racing Towards the Top, supra note 5, at 1769.
196 Donald C. Langevoort, Structuring Securities Regulation in the European
Union: Lessons from the US. Experience 19 (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Georgetown
Pub. Law Research, Working Paper No. 624582, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=624582.
197 See Breeden, supra note 166, at S81 (noting that the reason more companies do
primary offerings in the U.S. than anywhere else is "the ready availability of capital");
Tung, Monopolists, supra note 5, at 1397 (noting that the U.S. offers "the largest, deepest,
and most liquid market in the world... [with the] largest national pool of investors").
198 Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or
Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 141, 151 (2003) [hereinafter Licht, Cross-Listing]. The SEC
has approved these exemptions. Id.
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firms must disclose as a precondition to accessing capital in New York or
London, they often will. But the disclosure and corporate governance
requirements are an impediment, not an attraction, at least for the managers
who make the decisions. 200 Indeed, they are the most important deterrent to
cross-border listings.20 1 That accounts for the general trend, which is for
cross-listed companies to choose destination nations with lower, not higher,
accounting standards than those of their origin countries. 20 2 Many more
foreign companies would list in London or New York if they did not have to
disclose as much information about themselves or expose their managers to
199 Id. Also, the SEC has not been as active as it might have been in enforcing rules
against foreign issuers, so the bond is not as tight as it should be. See Jordan I. Siegel,
Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting US. Securities Laws?, 75 J.
FIN. EcoN. 319, 346-47 (2005) [hereinafter Siegel, Foreign Firms] (noting that
procedural obstacles also make private enforcement of U.S. securities laws by foreign
investors problematic); see also Jordan I. Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves
Effectively by Renting U.S. Securities Laws? (Feb. 4, 2004) (draft of working paper),
available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/jsiegel/jsiegel bondingpaper l00804.pdf
[hereinafter Siegel, 2004 Draft] (draft of article including text and tables). Siegel believes
that firms may cross-list voluntarily in the U.S. to gain reputational capital by disclosing
more than they are required to in their home country, id. at 33-39, but that the
reputational bond is not supplemented by any meaningful legal bond. Companies that
cross-list and do not steal from shareholders do well. Those that cross-list and do steal
from shareholders suffer reputational harm, as well they should. Id. at 38-39.
Coffee counters this study with the argument that even if the SEC does not file many
actions, the threat still may carry deterrence and the actions it does bring are sometimes
high profile and therefore may create the impression in foreign managers' and investors'
minds that this is a significant threat. Coffee, Racing Towards the Top, supra note 5, at
1794-96. There is something to this argument, but foreign fraud is difficult for the SEC
to detect and necessarily a low priority. Ferrell, supra note 146, at 38.
The SEC should be faulted for allowing these exclusions, because investors in other
nations count to some extent upon SEC supervision of their companies. See John Authers
& Sara Silver, It's Absurd for the SEC to Use a Mexican Company and Mexican Citizens
to Try to Impose US Regulations... ,FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 20, 2005, at 17 ("[In Mexico] there
is an implicit decision that the more foreign financial actors supervise Mexican entities
the more secure the Mexican financial system will be."); see also Siegel, Foreign Firms,
supra, at 322 (finding that the SEC and minority shareholders have not effectively
enforced U.S. law against cross listed firms).
200 James A. Fanto & Roberta S. Karmel, A Report on the Attitudes of Foreign
Companies Regarding a U.S. Listing, 3 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FiN. 51, 72 (1997) ("[SEC]
disclosure requirements impose significant costs upon a foreign company listing its
securities in the U.S., and these costs affect a company's listing decision.").
201 G. Andrew Karolyi, Why Do Companies List Shares Abroad? A Survey of the
Evidence and Its Managerial Implications, 7 FIN. MKTS., INST. & INSTRUMENTS 1 (1998)
[hereinafter Karolyi, Why List].
202 Licht, Cross-Listing, supra note 198, at 158.
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higher accountability and liability.20 3 Amir Licht surveyed several empirical
studies and concluded:
To the extent the corporate governance issues play a role in the cross-listing
decision, it is a negative role. The dominant factors in the choice of cross-
listing destination markets are access to cheaper finance and enhancing the
issuer's visibility. Corporation governance is a second-order consideration
whose effect is either to deter issuers from accessing better-regulated
markets or to induce securities regulators to allow foreign issuers to avoid
some of the more exacting domestic regulations.20 4
When foreign issuers explain why they list on U.S. exchanges, their
answers have little or nothing to do with bonding their reputation to investors
by disclosing more information. 20 5 When they explain the disadvantages or
obstacles to listing on U.S. exchanges, they consistently mention increased
disclosure, even though, as noted above, they are exempted from many of the
U.S. requirements for domestic firms. 206
Corporate managers typically drive the decisions whether to cross-list
securities, and their personal interests are often at cross-purposes with the
interests of companies' owners. 20 7 They are interested in less disclosure of
transactions that profit them personally and with less supervision,
accountability, and transparency. 20 8 They prefer the higher level of control
203 See Karolyi, Why List, supra note 201, at 35 (finding that "stringent disclosure
requirements are the greatest impediment to cross-border listings").
204 Licht, Cross-Listing, supra note 198, at 142 (emphasis added).
205 The reasons they give include (a) business reasons such as increased visibility or
facilitating a U.S. acquisition, (b) financial reasons, such as better price and liquidity,
(c) industry specific reasons such as the fact that competitors have also listed, and
(d) expansion of U.S. shareholder base because that is where the money is. Fanto &
Karmel, supra note 200, at 66-70.
206 Licht, Cross-Listing, supra note 198, at 156-57 ("[T]he surveys consistently
indicate that if increased disclosure levels under U.S. regulations play any role, then this
role is definitely a negative one.").
207 Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate
Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 195, 204 (2004) (also see sources cited
therein) [hereinafter Licht, Plug-Ins].
208 Licht, David's Dilemma, supra note 177, at 682. Licht notes:
[Mianagers would prefer to list on a market without a duty to disclose executive
compensation with a personal breakdown; controlling shareholders would prefer to
list on a market with lax disclosure and approval requirements regarding interested
party transactions; and insiders in general might prefer to list on a market with a
lenient anti-insider trading regime or weak enforcement.
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and ability to avoid accountability and liability for self-dealing that comes
with avoiding higher levels of disclosure.209 Indeed, several empirical studies
support the conclusion that "insiders may take advantage of cross-listings to
derive private benefits." 210 The bottom line is that most cross-listing
companies do so in spite of those standards rather than because of them.211
Exchanges are aware of these motivations and cater to them. Just as the
New York Stock Exchange in the early 1990s weakened its listing standards
rather than delisting a prominent company like General Motors, exchanges
across the world often choose to bend rather than enforce the rules. For
example, the Deutsch Bourse failed to delist Porsche AG, even though
Porsche refused to comply with the exchange's disclosure requirements. 212
Not surprisingly, then, international exchange competition tends to trend
downward:
" The London Stock Exchange (LSE) gained substantial ground on the
NYSE in the 1990s, in part because it had less rigorous listing
requirements.2 13
" The LSE outcompeted the Paris Bourse head-to-head by allowing
dealers to delay the reporting of block trades for several days. Although
this damaged transparency and therefore hurt investors, it was so
popular with the dealers that the Paris exchange was forced to change
its rules to allow this tactic as well.214
Id.
209 Ferrell, supra note 146, at 16.
210 Licht, Plug-Ins, supra note 207, at 206 (citing several studies). This should not
be surprising given evidence that when managers of American companies decide to list
their companies' shares on exchanges, they manage to act on private information before
exchange listings and delistings. See Gwendolyn P. Webb, Evidence of Managerial
Timing: The Case of Exchange Listings, 22 J. FIN. RES. 247 (1999).
211 This is not to say that all issuers in all circumstances seek to provide only the
lowest possible levels of disclosure. That would overstate the case substantially. Eric J.
Pan, Harmonization of U.S.-EU Securities Regulation: The Case for a Single European
Securities Regulator, 34 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 499, 531 (2003).
212 See Scott Miller, For Porsche Investors, Disclosure Matters Less than Rocking
Results, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2001, at C14 (noting that investors did not seem to mind
limited disclosure so long as the company appeared to be making lots of money).
213 See Jay D. Hansen, Note, London Calling?: A Comparison of London and U.S.
Stock Exchange Listing Requirements for Foreign Equity Securities, 6 DuKE J. COMp. &
INT'L L. 197, 221 (1995) ("[C]ompanies may meet [LSE] listing requirements without
compiling and disclosing as much information as is required for a U.S. listing.").
214 Robert Bloomfield & Maureen O'Hara, Can Transparent Markets Survive?, 55
J. FIN. ECON. 425, 426 (2000).
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* When Israel's stock exchange attempted to lure Israeli companies listed
only on U.S. stock markets by raising its listing standards, it learned
that many issuers had gone to the U.S. to avoid the more stringent
Israeli disclosure requirements and had no interest in returning. 215 The
American standards functionally "became the ceiling, [not the floor,]
for any future [Israeli] regulatory reform." 216
* Brazil's Novo Mercado set very high standards in order to attract
companies who would "bond" their reputation by complying. It was a
great idea theoretically, but few companies were interested in so
bonding. 217
* Germany's Neuer Markt has been touted as illustrating the success of
voluntary private contracts for investor protection rather than legal
regulation. 218 Unfortunately, the Neuer Markt, with its advertised high
standards for listing companies, totally collapsed when a wave of
accounting scandals, sham stocks, and insider trading frauds came to
light.219
215 Licht, David's Dilemma, supra note 177, at 703 ("For such issuers, piggybacking
on the U.S. market was a ride to the bottom.").
2 16 Id. at 702. See also Amir N. Licht, Managerial Opportunism and Foreign
Listing: Some Direct Evidence, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 325, 347 (2001) (noting that
"managerial opportunism is a significant factor in decision-making processes in public
corporations" and arguing that the fact that Israeli companies listed in the U.S., which
allowed relaxed disclosure for foreign firms, was a case of racing to the bottom); Tung,
Monopolists, supra note 5, at 1406 (also noting this race-to-the-bottom effect regarding
the listing of Israeli companies).
217 See Felix Salmon, Beware of the Bull, LATINFINANCE, Dec. 2004, at 26 ("[The
Novo Mercado] has attracted just five companies with an aggregate market capitalization
of $8.52 billion in November-less than 4% of the value of all Brazilian stocks."). As
this Article was being edited, more encouraging information came out of Brazil, which
instigated new reforms after the initial reforms failed. See Antonio Gledson de Carvalho
& George G. Pennacchi, Can Voluntary Market Reforms Promote Efficient Corporate
Governance? Evidence from Firms Migration to Premium Markets in Brazil 18 (January
25, 2005) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=678282
(finding that a new market, Bovespa, began innovations that give "credence to the view
that competition among the world's stock exchanges can lead to higher overall standards
for corporate governance and disclosure").
218 Choi, Issuer Choice, supra note 118, at 821.
219 See Michael Forman, Scandal, Not Scant Volume, Dooms Neuer Markt,
SECURITIES INDUS. NEWS, Oct. 7, 2002 (noting that "it was a parade of scandals-from
fraud, bankruptcies and illegal insider trading-that truly doomed" the Neuer Markt);
Current Economic Conditions, CANADIAN ECON. OBSERVER, Oct. 2002, at 1.7 (noting
that the Neuer Markt was soon to close "after the dot-coin crash and mounting reports of
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* Today, the NYSE is not competing with the LSE by touting its bonding
opportunities under Sarbanes-Oxley's Section 404; rather, the LSE is
urging companies to list with it to avoid the burdens of developing
reliable financial controls. 220
There are many good reasons to list on exchanges with relatively higher
listing standards. Companies get increased securities analyst coverage which,
in turn, increases firm value.221 Stock price performance may improve.222
Companies from civil law nations can profit by signaling to shareholders that
they intend to provide more protections to shareholders. 223 But less than ten
percent of companies eligible to cross-list do so, 224 and those that cross-list
tend to do so for less admirable reasons. In large part because corporate
insiders pursue their own interests at the expense of outsiders, 22 5 "the impact
of financial globalization has been remarkably limited. '226 Cross-listing will
continue to increase, of course, as international trends in securities markets
accelerate. But this most likely will continue to occur in spite of, rather than
because of, higher listing standards. Therefore, the focus for improving the
accounting fraud"); Rachel Stevenson, Scandals and Bankruptcies Destroy Germany's
Neuer Markt, THE INDEP. (LONDON), Sept. 27, 2002, at 23 ("A number of companies
listed on the [Neuer Markt] have gone bankrupt, directors have been charged with insider
dealing and fraud, and accounts have been questioned.").
220 See Andrei Postelnicu, NYSE Considers Earlier Start to Challenge Europe, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 15-16, 2005, at 31. The head of the NYSE responded by pointing out that
pressure stemming from Enron and Parmalat would cause European regulators to emulate
U.S. regulation and would therefore soon improve NYSE's relative position regarding
listings. See John Gapper, NYSE Chief Expects Europe to Move Closer, FIN. TIMEs, Jan.
28, 2005, at 31.
221 Mark H. Lang et al., ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does Cross Listing in the
US. Improve a Firm's Information Environment and Increase Market Value? 20 (NYSE,
Working Paper No. 2002-06, 2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/2002-06.pdf.
222 See Stephen R. Foerster & G. Andrew Karolyi, The Effects of Market
Segmentation and Investor Recognition on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks
Listing in the United States, 54 J. FN. 981, 1008 (1999) (finding positive, permanent
market reactions for Asian firms that list the shares in the U.S.).
223 See William A. Reese, Jr. & Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority
Shareholder Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity
Offerings, 66 J. FN. EcoN. 65, 66-67 (2002).
224 See Craig Doidge et al., Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?
(Ohio State Univ. Dice Ctr., Working Paper No. 2001-16, 2001) available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=285337.
225 See Licht, Plug-Ins, supra note 207, at 205 ("A sober analysis, especially of
recent unpublished studies, indicates that the bonding hypothesis does not receive support
from the extant empirical evidence while the avoiding hypothesis does.").
226 Rene M. Stulz, The Limits of Financial Globalization (NBER, Working Paper
No. W 11070, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/W 11070.
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fullness and accuracy of disclosure should be upon "sustained efforts by law
makers and regulators in firms' home countries," 227 rather than through
exchange-based competition.
VII. AN EXPLANATION
In this examination of various forms of regulatory competition to provide
securities law, two questions arose repeatedly. First, why is there so little
competition? Other authors have stressed that the incentives are simply not
there for legislators to toil away to produce the most efficient corporate or
securities laws in order to attract incorporations and firms wishing to be
governed by their securities laws.
This Article focuses on the second question: why is the competition that
does exist usually ambling toward the bottom rather than racing to the top?
Why does the "bonding" theory seem not to be realized in practice? The key
reason is that to the extent that states or nations or exchanges do wish to
compete for incorporations or listings, they know that managers make the
decisions and, unfortunately, managers' interests and shareholders' interests
are too often ill-aligned.
A. Managers Make Self-Serving Decisions
Regulatory competition's key premise is that "no government entity can
know better than market participants what regulations are in their interest,
particularly as firms' requirements are continually changing with shifting
financial market conditions." 228 Proponents of regulatory competition
minimize the fact that insofar as corporations are concerned, the "market
participants" who will be making these decisions are corporate managers.
These proponents assume that with this superior knowledge, if, all things
being equal, it is best for shareholders to impose high levels of mandatory
disclosure, officers and directors will choose it. If, all things being equal, it is
best for shareholders to choose a regime with stringent insider trading
controls, officers and directors will choose it. If, all things being equal, it is
best for shareholders to have stringent limitations upon and full disclosure of
executive and director compensation, officers and directors will choose it. If,
all things being equal, shareholders are best served by strong civil and
criminal liability for misfeasance and malfeasance by managers, those
managers will choose it. These assumptions are facially implausible. Admati
and Pfleiderer have noted that "[flull voluntary disclosure ... rarely seems to
227 Licht, Cross-Listing, supra note 198, at 163.
228 Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 48, at 2365.
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occur in reality, and firms typically do not disclose more than regulation
requires." 229 In a post-Enron world, blind faith in manager good faith seems
positively quaint.230
1. Conscious Self-Interest
Both managers' conscious desire to advance their personal interests and
the self-serving bias that causes them to unconsciously advance their own
agendas at the expense of their shareholder-principals make it unlikely that
managers will be able to make the incorporation, choice-of-regime, or listing
decisions objectively in the best interests of the firm.231
To begin with conscious self-interest, a quick reading of Bebchuk and
Fried's recent book on executive compensation 232 or any of the Enron
exposes 233 will quickly disabuse anyone of the notion that one may safely
assume that managers choose incorporation sites (or make any other decision
regarding the firm) without making their own best interests a primary
consideration. Top executives take care of themselves and they take care of
each other when they serve on one another's boards.
Too often managers will act to protect their perquisites, even at the
expense of their shareholders. 234 Academic studies demonstrate:
In public corporations, managers push for staggered boards, limits to
shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for
229 See Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Forcing Firms to Talk. Financial
Disclosure Regulation and Externalities, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 479,480 (2000).
230 Greenwood notes that "regardless of where it is made, state corporate law either
is directed to the perceived needs of corporate management or it is empty, 'rusted girders,
internally welded together and containing nothing but wind,' because all management
need do to avoid unwanted regulation is to reincorporate in Delaware." Greenwood,
supra note 88, at 388.
231 See Prentice, Strong SEC, supra note 3, at 32-37.
232 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (painting an ugly picture of
managers pervasively subordinating shareholder interests in order to maximize their own
compensation).
233 See, e.g., KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS (2005) (painting a vivid
picture of managers consciously and subconsciously sacrificing shareholder welfare for
personal advancement); BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN
THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003) (same).
234 See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597,
640 (1989) ("Evidence concerning targets also suggests that many managers pursue their
own objectives even if shareholders lose."). Black also notes that acquirers' managers
often act contrary to their shareholders' interests as well. Id.
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mergers and charter amendments, poison pills, and golden parachutes,
even though all of these limit shareholder control and reduce
shareholder value. 235
" In IPOs, managers install antitakeover provisions, though these also
undermine shareholder value. 236
* Just before IPOs, managers are more likely to manipulate discretionary
accruals to beautify the financial statements if they intend to sell their
own shares in an "attempt to maximize their personal wealth at the
expense of other investors." 237
*Managers engage in self-enriching related-party transactions, even
though such transactions are negatively associated with their firms'
stock market returns. 238
*Managers often report illusory earnings needed to earn short-term
bonuses,239 even though their companies will have to pay taxes on
those fake earnings. 240
235 See Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance? (Harvard
John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 491, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=593423 (producing empirical results indicating that
these six factors adversely affect shareholder value).
236 Daines & Klausner, supra note 54 (finding that anti-takeover provisions are
common in IPOs and that they are explained by management entrenchment).
237 See Masako Darrough & Srinivasan Rangan, Do Insiders Manipulate Earnings
When They Sell Their Shares in an Initial Public Offering?, 43 J. ACCT. REs. 1, 31
(2005).
238 Some economists have argued that companies benefit from related-party
transactions, but this turns out not to be the case. See Elizabeth Gordon et al., Related
Party Transactions: Associations with Corporate Governance and Firm Value (European
Fin. Assoc. 2004 Maastricht Meetings, Paper No. 4377, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=558983.
239 See Flora Guidry et al., Earnings-Based Bonus Plans and Earnings Management
by Business-Unit Managers, 26 J. ACCT. & ECON., 113, 140 (1999) (reporting an
empirical study finding "evidence ... consistent with business-unit managers
manipulating earnings to maximize their short-term bonus plans").
240 Targets of SEC allegations of accounting fraud from 1996-2002, "[i]n
aggregate,.., paid $320 million to the taxing authorities as a result of overstating
earnings by approximately $3.6 billion." See Merle Erickson, Michelle Hanlon, &
Edward L. Maydew, How Much Will Firms Pay for Earnings That Do Not Exist?
Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent Earnings 5 (unpublished working paper,
Nov. 1, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=347420.
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*Managers also "are more likely to fund intermediaries [such as
auditors] that favor managers than those that effectively curb
management opportunism." 241
*Managers typically select accounting procedures that are most
favorable to themselves even if they are not the most favorable
procedures for their firm.242
In light of this evidence, it seems foolhardy to assume, as regulatory
competition does, that managers will select the legal regime that best
advances shareholder interests.
2. Unconscious Bias
Even managers who are consciously trying to serve their principals' best
interests will be affected by the self-serving bias. This will tend to affect their
gathering, processing, analyzing, and remembering of information, leading
them to reach conclusions, unjustified by objective reality, about the firms'
prospects and their responsibility for them.243 They will tend to believe that
the firms' best interests are served by maximizing manager discretion,
compensation, and protection from liability. Put it all together, and some
have concluded that conscious self-interest and unconscious bias are the
reasons that "empire-building and excessive self-confidence are likely to be
the main sources of corporate governance failures in developed market
economies." 244
B. Restraints Do Not Work
Theoretically, a number of nongovernmental restraints work to prevent
manager self-interest from sacrificing investor interests. In reality, these
restraints fail too often.
241 See Choi & Fisch, supra note 141, at 275.
242 Dan S. Dhaliwal et al., The Effect of Owner Versus Management Control on the
Choice of Accounting Methods, 4 J. ACCT. & ECON. 41, 52 (1982) (finding that managers
pick the accounting method that is most favorable to them individually even if it is not
most favorable to their firm).
243 See MAx H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 141-42
(5th ed. 2002) (describing this bias generally).
244 Berglof& Claessens, supra note 185, at 13 n.4.
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1. Market Restraints Fail
The regulatory competition line of argument provides that the markets
will discipline managers, forcing them to act in the best interests of
shareholders or lose their positions. For a number of reasons, this is unduly
optimistic, as experience in the Enron era resplendently illustrates.
a. Issuers Access the Markets Infrequently
Reputational constraints work best on companies that must access the
capital markets.245 Unfortunately, most public companies access the equity
markets only infrequently, 246 so the market's opportunity to discipline the
managers of those companies by punishing their firms in the marketplace
when they try to access capital is spotty at best.
b. Managers Are Willing to Leave Money on the Table
Regulatory competition proponents further assume that managers will
not choose regimes that exculpate them from fraud liability, for example,
because if they do "investors will either not invest in the firm at all or will
require a higher return on the investment. '247 They ignore the unhappy fact
that crooks will gladly leave some money on the table that would have gone
into corporate coffers had they not exempted themselves from fraud liability
given that what money does come in can be appropriated with near
245 Id. at 17 ("The obvious problem with self-enforcement through reputation is that
it relies on future interactions, e.g., that [firms] will have to come back to the stock
market for more funding."). The authors go on to note:
Moreover, since the costs of building reputation are sunk, they may not deter future
violations if the gains are sufficiently large. An additional problem of the reputation
mechanism is that memory, particularly in stock markets, may be short. With losses
to investors from previous violations already incurred and new investors coming
into the market, considerations of new investments may not be affected by previous
actions, thus weakening the commitment power of reputation in financial markets.
Id.
246 See Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Is CEO
Overconfidence the Product of Corporate Governance? 23 (Washington Univ. Sch. of
Law Faculty Series, Working Paper No. 04-08-02, 2004), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-587162 (noting that "many companies need to raise capital
relatively infrequently" and that even poorly performing companies can "almost always"
raise funds).
247 Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 48, at 2366.
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impunity. 248 Many managers will gladly forfeit funds that might be helpful to
the firm in the future in exchange for personal liability protection now.
Some regulatory competition advocates concede that for companies that
do not need to access the market for capital, reputation exerts no strong
pressure. However, in the IPO setting, they claim that firms will have every
incentive to cater to shareholder interests. For example, Choi and Pritchard
have argued that IPO
firms will have strong incentives to select regimes that maximize the total
value of the company. At the time of the initial incorporation, these firms
will select the takeover regime that maximizes value .... If such a rule is
value maximizing, it will be adopted by the firm at the time of the initial
public offering. 24 9
Yet again, however, theory does not jibe with empirical evidence. At
IPOs, officers often leave 15%, 20%, even 40% of the money they could
raise for the company on the table through underpricing.250 They do this
particularly in cases in which their share of the overall take is relatively small
and when their families and friends are part of "directed share programs" and
thereby are enabled to buy shares at the low IPO price.25 1
And, contrary to regulatory competition theory, they adopt anti-takeover
devices that harm shareholders too, as Choi and Pritchard admit,252
248 See Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation?, supra note 2, at 1446-47 (making
this argument).
249 Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in
Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REv. 961, 982-83 (2001) [hereinafter Choi & Guzman,
Choice].
250 Alexander Ljungqvist, IPO Underpricing, in HANDBOOK IN CORPORATE
FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 1 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., forthcoming 2005)
(noting that IPO underpricing averaged "21% in the 1960s, 12% in the 1970s, 16% in the
1980s, 21% in the 1990s, and 40% in the four years since 2000"). Part of officers'
motivation for leaving millions on the table in the recent dot-com boom may have been
the payoffs they received in the form of opportunities for personal allocations of other hot
IPO shares offered by the underwriters they chose to take their firms public. See Google's
IPO: A Cartel-Buster, ECONOMIST, May 8, 2004, at 14 (noting that "[i]nstitutional
shareholders and corporate bosses were plied with IPO allocations in return for inflated
commissions and future favours").
251 See Alexander Ljungqvist & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., IPO Pricing in the Dot-
Com Bubble, 58 J. FIN. 723, 750-51 (2003).
252 Robert Daines & Michael D. Klausner, Agents Protecting Agents: An Empirical
Study of Takeover Defenses in Spinoffs (Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Prog. in Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 299, 2004), available at
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conceding that "such evidence may point out that firms even at the time of
the initial public offering do not maximize firm value." 253 Furthermore,
Daines and Klausner have found that when parent managers would
personally benefit by entrenching the managers of companies that they spin
off, they are much more likely to include takeover defenses in the spinoff's
management structure. 254 These defenses will likely reduce the amount of
money the firm can raise through the spin off, but managers apparently
conclude that the personal benefit to them makes it worthwhile. Similarly,
studies show that IPO firms commonly leave money on the table by adopting
corporate governance schemes that do not maximize shareholder
protection. 255
c. Managers Can Manipulate Numbers to Meet Bonus Targets
One might argue that managers' interests can be aligned with those of
shareholders by using incentive plans that tie managerial compensation to
performance. Firms have been trying to do this for a decade and what we
have ended up with is CEO compensation that has risen like a rocket, largely
de-coupled from any performance criteria.256 Attempts to re-couple
compensation to performance face difficult hurdles, given managers' ability
to manipulate earnings to favor short-term performance. 257 Even the
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf~abstract id=637001 (finding that antitakeover provisions
are common in IPOs and that they are explained by management entrenchment).
253 Choi & Guzman, Choice, supra note 249, at 985.
254 Daines & Klausner, supra note 252, at 25 (finding also that this entrenchment
reduces share value in the parent).
255 See Gretchen Morgenson, New Stocks, Same Old Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2005, at BU1 (citing study by Linda R. Killian).
256 See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 232.
257 See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher
Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries 40 (Law & Econ. Workshop, UC-
Berkeley, Paper No. 11, 2002), available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1047&context=berkeleyjlawec
on. The authors note:
[M]anagement can exercise its control over the quality of the information in order to
reduce the market's capacity for oversight. Earnings manipulation provides the
classic example of this type of abuse. Management may be particularly prone to
present an inflated picture of the firm's financial health in order to maintain their
positions, to obtain performance-based bonuses or to increase the value of their
stock or stock options. This may even lead managers to adjust the firm's operations
to favor short term performance at the cost of the firm's long-run financial health.
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instigators of the stock option craze, Kevin Murphy and Michael Jensen, now
realize that managers can easily manipulate share prices in the short-term.258
As practiced, equity-based compensation facilitates rather than limits
managerial opporiunism. 259 Much empirical work supports this conclusion.
For example, academic studies indicate that the more sensitive a CEO's
option portfolio is to stock price, the more likely is the CEO's firm to
manage earnings, 260  misreport its financial condition,26 1 or commit
accounting fraud.262
d. Hostile Takeovers Are Not a Viable Restraint
Some claim that the market for corporate control can constrain managers
from making reincorporation or other decisions that hurt shareholders. 263
However, because tender offers are extremely costly,264 they remain
258 Margaret M. Blair, Directors' Duties in a Post-Enron World. Why Language
Matters, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 885, 894 (2003).
259 See McDonnell, Stuck, supra note 68, at 694.
260 See Sarah McVay et al., Trading Incentives to Meet Earnings Thresholds
(unpublished working paper, on file with the Univ. of Mich. Bus. Sch., July 2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=555202 (finding
common indicators of earnings management when managers sell more shares).
261 See Natasha Bums & Simi Kedia, The Impact of Performance-Based
Compensation on Misreporting (unpublished working paper, June 2004), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-555903; Jap Efendi et al., Why Do Corporate Managers
Misstate Financial Statements? The Role of In-The-Money Options and Other Incentives
(unpublished working paper, Oct. 27, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractid=547922 (finding a strong link
between the likelihood of an accounting restatement and the CEO's holding of in-the-
money options).
262 See Merle Erickson, Michelle Hanlon, & Edward L. Maydew, Is There a Link
Between Executive Compensation and Accounting Fraud? 1 (unpublished working paper,
Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=509505
(reporting empirical fimdings that "a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of
compensation that is stock-based increases the probability of an accounting fraud by
approximately 68%"). See also Bin Ke, Do Equity-Based Incentives Induce CEOs to
Manage Earnings to Report Strings of Consecutive Earnings Increases? (unpublished
working paper, Feb. 22, 2004), available at
http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/b/x/bxkl 27/research/papers/eamingduration.pdf
(finding that firms with CEOs who have high amounts of equity incentives related to
unrestricted stock or options immediately exercisable tend to exhibit more activities
consistent with earnings management).
263 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 38, at 213-15.
264 See K. A. D. Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in
Corporate Law, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 1426, 1442 ("[A] significant takeover spread, well
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relatively rare, and only a tiny fraction of American public companies ever
face a hostile takeover bid.265 Furthermore, most bids fail.266 Many
companies have staggered boards and poison pills and these tend to minimize
the number of bids, reduce dramatically the number of successful bids, and
overall reduce shareholder return. 267 The very fact that jurisdictions seem to
cater to corporate managers by enacting takeover laws that allow poison pills
and other defenses not only shows that takeovers are not a viable restraint,
but undermines the entire race-to-the-top thesis. 268
Furthermore, there is much evidence that the theoretical picture of
efficient sharks searching for and finding underperforming companies with
incompetent officers and then taking them over and replacing them with
more competent managers269 is only occasionally true.270 Substantial
evidence indicates that behavioral factors such as overconfidence by the
managers of offerors may have more to do with why takeovers occur than
any underperformance by target management. 271 The facts that (a) share
over twenty percent, must exist before a takeover artist will find painting worthwhile.");
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative
Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 125 (1994) (noting several reasons why hostile takeovers
are an imperfect monitoring device).
265 Ninety-eight percent of mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. are friendly. See
John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271,274 (2000).
266 See Gregor Andrade, Mark L. Mitchell & Erik Stafford, New Evidence and
Perspectives on Mergers (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 01-070, 2001),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=269313 (finding that hostile tender offers virtually
disappeared in the 1990s); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Anti-takeover
Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002)
[hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Staggered Boards].
267 See Bebchuk et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 266, at 931.
268 See McDonnell, Stuck, supra note 68, at 696-97 (noting that if incumbent
managers can protect their positions by incorporating in states with protective laws, they
likely will be willing to suffer any pain caused by concomitant reduced stock prices).
269 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1981)
(theorizing without evidence that "the most probable explanation for unfriendly takeovers
emphasizes their role in monitoring the performance of corporate managers").
270 See generally Robert A. Prentice & John A. Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers
and the "Nancy Reagan Defense ": May Target Boards "Just Say No"? Should They be
Allowed To?, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 420-25 (1990) (citing evidence inconsistent with
this "pruning deadwood" thesis).
271 See, e.g., Pamela R. Haunschild et al., Managerial Overcommitment in
Corporate Acquisition Processes, 5 ORG. ScI. 528 (1994); Pekka Hietala et al., What Is
the Price of Hubris? Using Takeover Battles to Infer Overpayments and Synergies, 32
FIN. MGMT. 5, 7-8 (2003); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisition?
CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction (Stanford Univ., Working Paper, 2003),
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prices often do not reflect value; 272 (b) there is substantial controversy
regarding whether mergers, on average, create or destroy shareholder
value; 273 (c) many hostile takeovers result in financial debacles; 274 and (d) a
substantial percentage of takeovers occur for strategic reasons, such as that
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=470788 (finding a strong role played by CEO
overconfidence in merger activity); Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate
Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197 (1986) (originating the hubris hypothesis).
272 Blair notes:
If one lesson of Enron and other corporate disasters in the last few years is that
today's share price cannot be counted on to reflect the true underlying value of the
equity of a corporation, then the rise in share prices in the short run after the
announcement of a hostile tender offer cannot necessarily be interpreted as
reflecting a true increase in value that would result from the takeover. And if the rise
in share prices is not uncontestable evidence that value will be created by a proposed
takeover, then this undercuts a key contention of takeover advocates who had argued
that the "market for corporate control" provides sufficient discipline to be sure that
corporate officers and directors use their authority over corporate resources in ways
that tend to maximize value creation by corporations.
Blair, supra note 258, at 894.
273 See Anup Agrawal et al., The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A
Re-Examination of an Anomaly, 47 J. FIN. 1605, 1611-12 (1992) (finding tender offer
acquirers perform poorly after the acquisition, particularly if it is a cash offer); Paul
Andre et al., The Long-Run Performance of Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence from the
Canadian Stock Market, 27 FIN. MGMT. 27, 41 (2004) (finding that over the three-year
post-event period, Canadian acquirers significantly underperformed); Paul M. Healey et
al., Which Takeovers are Profitable? Strategic or Financial?, 38 SLOAN MGMT. REV.,
Summer 1997, at 45, 55 (finding that acquisitions are generally break-even investments
and that friendly mergers tend to do better than hostile takeovers); Malmendier & Tate,
supra note 271, at 1 ("The results of the empirical literature on the overall return to
mergers... [suggests] that mergers may have no value on average."); Sara B. Moeller,
Frederik Paul Schlingemann & Rene M. Stulz, Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale?
A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave J. FIN. (forthcoming
2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-571064 (finding that acquiring firm
shareholders lost twelve cents per dollar spent on acquisitions-$240 billion-from 1998
through 2002). But see Andrade et al., supra note 266 (finding that hostile takeovers
virtually disappeared in the 1990s and that the friendly mergers that occurred generally
created value); ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL: M&A LESSONS THAT RISE
ABOVE THE ASHES 14-16 (2005) (arguing that mergers tend to create value, but averages
are distorted by a relatively few large deals that fail badly).
274 The AT&T purchase of NCR is a classic example. See Jaikumar Vijayan & April
Jacobs, Warning Signs of a Merger Gone Bad, COMPUTER WORLD, June 30, 1997, at 17
(noting clashes of corporate culture); Bart Ziegler, NCR Gets Yet Another New Lease on
Life, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1996, at BI (noting huge overpayment by AT&T).
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the shark and target are a good match in an industry that is consolidating, 275
further undermine the efficiency/market disciplining story. So does the fact
that most top managers receive generous golden parachutes if they leave the
acquired company and handsome bonuses if they stay with it. So does the
fact that in recent years serial acquisitions have been used frequently to
"mask deteriorating financial results ... and to reap outside executive
pay"276 at companies such as Tyco, Waste Management, and WorldCom.
In the face of competitive pressure, potential acquirers are more likely to
look for competent firms to acquire, not incompetent ones.277 While the
evidence regarding whether hostile takeover targets are underperforming is
decidedly mixed, 278 there is certainly no conclusive evidence that targets
tend to be run by incompetent managers. 279 Indeed, hostile bidders indicate
that they seek well-managed companies rather than poorly-managed ones, 280
275 See Bernard Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597,
609 (1989) (noting that tender offer waves often concentrate on troubled industries where
even well-managed firms have struggled).
276 See Gretchen Morgenson, What Are Mergers Good For?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
June 8, 2005, at 56.
277 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical
Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1145, 1212 (1984) [hereinafter Coffee, Regulating the Market] (citing study indicating
that eighty-four percent of bidders surveyed looked for excellent management in takeover
target).
278 Compare Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Hostile Takeovers and the Correction of
Managerial Failure, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 163, 175 (1996) (finding in a study of British
takeovers that "performance of targets of hostile bids is not inferior to that of a
nonmerging sample of firms matched on the basis of size and industry"); JOHN POUND,
ARE TAKEOVER TARGETS UNDERVALUED? AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TARGET COMPANIES (1986) (finding that takeover firms
are not particularly undervalued or underperforming when related to a randomly selected
control group); G. William Schwert, Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?,
55 J. FIN. 2599, 2638 (2000) (finding in study that "[w]hen trying to explain the
occurrence of hostility [in takeover bids], the variables that are most likely to reflect poor
target management... contribute little explanatory power"), with Randall Morck et al.,
Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 101 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) (finding that
target firms are poorly performing but not necessarily undervalued by the market).
279 See Lynn E. Browne & Eric S. Rosengren, Are Hostile Takeovers Different?, in
THE MERGER BOOM 199, 224 (1987) ("[T]he unremarkable nature of hostile takeover
targets and the absence of clear evidence of management failure casts doubt on the
argument that hostile takeovers exert a useful discipline on managers generally.").
280 See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Hostile Tender Offer is Critical Issue for Congress,
LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 21, 1985, at 19, 21 ("Generally, it is not poorly run companies, but
well-run ones, that find themselves targets."); W.T. Grimm & Co., 1984 MERGERSTAT
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and they typically retain the incumbent management team to the extent
feasible. 281
Furthermore, no shark ever selected a target because its managers
refused to reincorporate in a jurisdiction with more efficient law. For all of
these reasons, it seems clear that hostile takeovers are not closely related to
manager performance and are totally unrelated to whether managers are
choosing efficient legal regimes. If takeovers are not closely related to
manager performance, and they clearly are not, then they can hardly serve a
disciplining function.282 They cannot and do not sufficiently encourage
corporate managers to scout around for the most efficient corporate or
securities law.
e. Investors Cannot Accurately Value Risk
Some regulatory competition proponents are realistic enough to realize
that managers often select legal regimes that are less than optimal in terms of
promoting shareholder interest. They assume that some issuers will signal
their quality by opting into regimes with mandatory full disclosure and strong
antifraud protection, that others will signal lack of quality by opting into
regimes with lesser levels of disclosure and protection, and that investors will
efficiently discount the shares of the latter corporations. This assumption is
consistent with strong versions of signaling theory, 283 but signaling theory is
predicated upon several often unrealistic assumptions284 and is not effective
REVIEW 7 (noting that "[tihe acquired companies, in most cases, ranked first or second
within their industries").
281 See Robert W. Hamilton, Private Sale of Control Transactions: Where We Stand
Today, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 248, 254 n.18 (1985) (noting that most bidders "try to
encourage [target managers] to remain in place after the takeover"); David J. Ravenscraft
& F.M. Scherer, Mergers and Managerial Performance, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS &
TARGETS 194, 196 (John C. Coffee et al. eds., 1988) (reporting that none of the hostile
bidders in their study "intended to purge the acquired firm's managerial ranks").
2 82 See generally Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing
Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance: Too Little, but Not Too Late, 43
AM. U. L. REv. 379, 419-22 (arguing that hostile bids do not serve salutary disciplining
function); Prentice & Langmore, supra note 270, at 420-25 (same); Cynthia A. Williams
& John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way?: The Erosion of the Anglo-American
Shareholder Value Construct 6 n.20 (Univ. N.C Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 04-
09, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-632347 (noting that if the takeover
markets are supposed to serve a disciplining function, they do it very badly).
283 See Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications
of Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION
177-202 (Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979) (discussing signaling theory generally).
284 Among these assumptions are (a) no fraud, (b) disclosure is costless, (c) the
investor knows the scope of information that is actually available, and (d) investors
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"[i]f disclosure signals are noisy, i.e., support more than one inference about
the information provider... ."285 Regulatory competition, by fragmenting the
investment picture, makes it very difficult for quality issuers to send a signal
of their quality,286 and very difficult for investors to read those signals. 287
In another article, I used behavioral decision theory to challenge the
assumption that investors in a regulatory competition scheme will be able to
efficiently price the various choices that issuing companies' managers make
regarding listing.288 Nonbehavioral arguments are just as persuasive. For
example, economic theory provides that if one firm in an industry voluntarily
discloses good news, the stock price of competitors should drop as investors
draw unfavorable inferences from their failure to disclose. In real life,
however, the stock prices of competitors tend to stay the same or even
increase. 289 Even if the stock price of other firms did drop, there is no
guarantee that the market would not impose too great a discount.290 When
companies that are competitors disclose different things at different times in
different formats, which regulatory competition encourages, it is exceedingly
difficult for investors to draw proper inferences.
Thus, although many proponents of regulatory competition assume that
investors will be able to rationally and accurately discount for issuer
decisions to list in minimum-disclosure, fraud-friendly jurisdictions, this
assumption is inaccurate. As Jackson has asked: "[C]ould capital markets be
expected to price, in any meaningful sense, differences between French and
understand and accurately process the information that is provided. None of these
assumptions is necessarily accurate. See Franco, supra note 188, at 262-64 (discussing
the assumptions), 265-76 (debunking the assumptions).
285 Id. at 264.
286 Rock points out that "[t]he danger is that regulatory competition may lead to
fragmentation and thereby undermine the ability of any regulatory system to offer issuers
the opportunity to commit credibly to maintain a given level of disclosure indefinitely."
Rock, supra note 184, at 695.
287 Regulatory competition will likely create the bizarre result that an investor's Dell
stock will be governed by a totally different set of disclosures and protections than her
HP stock. How does an investor value those differences?
288 See Prentice, Strong SEC, supra note 3, at 40-41 and accompanying text.
289 See, e.g., G.J. Clinch & N.A. Sinclair, Intra-industry Information Releases: A
Recursive Systems Approach, 9 J. ACCT. & EcON. 87, 89-105 (1987) (finding stock price
increase for nondisclosing competitors); Baruch Lev & Stephen H. Penman, Voluntary
Forecast Disclosure, Nondisclosure and Stock Prices, 28 J. ACCT. REs. 49, 74 (1990)
(finding no stock price reaction for nondisclosing firms).
290 See Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets, 35
U.C. Avis L. REV. 533, 550 (2002) [hereinafter Choi, Selective Disclosures] (suggesting
that this might happen).
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Malaysian securities regulation?" 29 1 Even pricing the difference between
Delaware's laws and New Jersey's is difficult, especially given Delaware's
surfeit of open-ended rules that grant courts wide latitude for interpretation
and for imposition of fact-specific determinations.
292
A decision by an American company to list in Italy or Paraguay sends a
very obscure signal. Does listing in a jurisdiction with few antifraud
protections mean that the company intends to commit fraud, or only that it is
trying to reduce its liability insurance costs? 293 Or perhaps to hire managers
who do not wish to work for it in a higher liability regime? And what does it
mean that a manager does not wish to work for this company except under
circumstances of complete protection from fraud liability? 294 Is she just risk
averse or does she have a slothful nature and/or sinister motives?
Consider that many companies have recently complained about the costs
of Sarbanes-Oxley's § 404 requirements regarding internal financial
controls.2 95 This is certainly a reasonable complaint, and investors may well
think nothing ill of companies that choose to deregister with the SEC and
stop complying with mandatory financial disclosure requirements for
registered companies. However, a recent study indicated that while most
strong firms are not considering "going dark," managers of poorly
291 See Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in
Financial Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 649, 661 (2001).
292 See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Theory of Indeterminancy in Corporate Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1913-23 (1998); McDonnell, Stuck, supra note 68, at 702 ("There
is a fairly widespread complaint that [Delaware] law has become somewhat arbitrary,
complex, and hard to predict.").
293 Similarly, does listing in a jurisdiction that lacks comprehensive mandatory
disclosure mean that the company has something illicit to hide? Or is it just trying to hide
information that would be useful to its competitors? Because there can be legitimate
reasons not to disclose, investors cannot just "assume the worst" when companies choose
not to disclose. "In other words, competitive forces negate the ability of the market to
induce managements to provide full disclosure by punishing non-disclosure." Goshen &
Parchomovsky, supra note 9 1, at 44.
294 See McDonnell, Stuck, supra note 68, at 694. McDonnell notes:
If setting stock prices is more of a crap shoot than traditional law and economic
analysis would have it, then it is quite possible that the chaos of trying to price a new
company's stock accurately, taking into account hundreds of idiosyncratic factors,
will completely swamp out any effect the state of incorporation may have on the
price.
Id.
295 The SEC is, at this writing, looking at ways to minimize the costs that § 404
imposes upon market participants. See, e.g., Andrew Parker, Donaldson May Bend on
Sarbanes-Oxley, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at 27.
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performing firms may be choosing to do so in order to hide their struggles or
to increase their private control benefits.296 Another study found that while
companies are complaining of excessive regulatory burdens following
Sarbanes-Oxley, the costs of being public remain a relatively insignificant
factor in decisions to go private.297 Thus, while the market is taking a
negative view of firms that are voluntarily delisting, it is probably not being
sufficiently hard on those whose managers are delisting for private control
reasons, but is being too hard on firms that are delisting because of Sarbanes-
Oxley's costly requirements (but cannot be distinguished from the firms that
are delisting for more sinister reasons).
Ultimately, Professor Cox is correct to argue that the fact that capital
markets are noisy "does not support subjecting investors to multiple
disclosure standards." 298 Ruder agrees, noting that "[i]t is difficult to imagine
how an investor would be able to judge the effectiveness of different
regulatory regimes, much less quantify that knowledge in a manner allowing
the investor to change the purchasing or selling price of a particular
security. '299 Absent a regime of mandatory disclosure applicable to all
issuers, less-than-candid issuers can manipulate investors by use of timing
opportunism, selective disclosure, and less transparent or less comparable
disclosure of information. 300
To the extent that issuer choice is based on an assumption that "rational
and informed investors will increase their willingness to pay for securities
296 Christian Leuz, Alexander J. Triantis & Tracy Yue Wang, Why Do Firms Go
Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations
(unpublished working paper, Nov. 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-592421.
297 See Peter C. Hsu, Going Private-A Response to an Increased Regulatory
Burden? 45 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 04-16, 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-619501 ("At the end, only very few companies
probably undertook a going private because of the primary reason of saving costs of
being public ....").
298 Cox, supra note 79, at 1234.
299 David S. Ruder, Reconciling U.S. Disclosure Policy with International
Accounting and Disclosure Standards, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 10 (1996); see also
Uri Geiger, Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market-A
Proposal, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1785, 1794 (1998) ("If the standards of many nations
were accepted in one market, it would be difficult for investors to compare their
investment opportunities.").
300 Franco, supra note 188, at 285-89.
The benefits of comparability are difficult to overstate. See Ian P. Dewing & Peter
0. Russell, Accounting, Auditing and Corporate Governance of European Listed
Countries: EU Policy Developments Before and After Enron, 42 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 289, 289 (2004) ("Robust, comparable and transparent information is fundamental
to the successful operation of the European Union's (EU) internal market.").
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from issuers that adopt valued investor protections," 30 1 the fact that
behavioral studies demonstrate that investors are often far from rational-
that the judgment biases of even sophisticated institutional investors "are not
merely isolated quirks, rather, they are consistent, deep-rooted, and
systematic behavioral patterns" 3 2-undermines the entire concept.
Alternatives to SEC-required disclosure are not appealing. If mandatory
disclosure were eliminated and replaced by private contracting, each investor
would have to bargain with each seller over the information to be disclosed.
But there is no guarantee that the information would be presented in a
comparably detailed and formatted way. The consequences for transaction
costs would be unfortunate. Romano herself admits that even institutional
investors are not skilled at obtaining private information possessed by
firms,30 3 and that institutional investors find it more cost-effective to have
issuers disclose information than to find it themselves. 304
In a regulatory competition regime, in which companies can choose state
regimes or international regimes with different requirements as to subjects to
be addressed, different rules for what must be disclosed about those subjects,
different accounting rules, and different antifraud rules, investors will incur
much greater search costs in order to gather such information, and it is
unlikely that disclosure comparability will ever occur. 305
For example, eliminating uniformity of accounting rules would be hugely
disadvantageous to most investors. Comparability is so important in
accounting rules that the SEC works constantly with the international
community in an attempt to move in the direction of more nation-to-nation
standardization (with the SEC serving as a gatekeeper to ensure certain
minimum levels) 30 6 and coordinated enforcement efforts. 30 7 Standardization
301 Stephen J. Choi, Assessing Regulatory Responses to Securities Market
Globalization, 2 THEoRETIcAL INQUIRIEs LAW 613, 616 (2001).
302 Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003).
303 Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 48, at 2416.
304 Id. at 2417.
305 SEC requirements set a standard that investors adopt. Because of that, domestic
issuers of exempt securities frequently will voluntarily disclose much of the information
that the SEC would have required had the securities not been exempt. Similarly,
securities professionals in Europe make "U.S.-style" disclosures voluntarily because
investors want them. Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in
International Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999-Part I, 56 Bus. LAW.
653,685-86(2001).
306 Trachtman, supra note 106, at 12 (noting efforts of the International Accounting
Standards Committee to create international accounting standards, of the International
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and comparability increase the value of information,308 and make investors
more comfortable and more willing to invest.30 9 Without standardization,
most issuers will, to the extent possible, tend to choose their own standards in
a strategic way to hide or minimize their particular problems and highlight
their own advantages. The indisputable benefits of standardization and
restricted strategic disclosure argue strongly for mandatory disclosure and
directly "conflict with the notion of issuers selecting among the disclosure
standards of different jurisdictions." 310
Professor Romano has conceded the value of standardization and, when
writing of her domestic state regulatory competition plan for securities law,
suggests that "the most significant area of standardization, firms' financial
reporting, would still be controlled by the private sector under the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and thus be consistent across firms
complying with its rules." 311 Of course, if there is truly to be competition,
then the states must be free to overrule FASB. California must be free to
allow companies registering there to avoid expensing options, even as New
York requires them to do so. Massachusetts must be free to require its
companies to eliminate pooling when they merge, whereas Nevada must be
free to allow it. As Coffee notes in the international issuer choice context,
"one U.S.-incorporated company could adopt Italian accounting and
disclosure standards; another Greek; and a third, Korean."
312
When confronted with the "Tower of Babel" argument, Choi and
Guzman, after touting the benefits of many choices for issuers, take the
position that there actually will not be that many because "[d]omestic
investors are likely to gravitate to their country's own securities regime."
313
In other words, the advantages of standardized and uniform accounting for
Organization of Securities Commissions to set minimum standards for non-financial
disclosure, and of the SEC to keep the bar at an acceptable level).
307 See Diane P. Wood, International Law and Federalism: What is the Reach of
Regulation?, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 97, 107 (1999) (noting SEC approach of
coordinated enforcement).
308 Gerard Hertig et al., Issuers and Investor Protection, in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 193, 206 (Reiner R.
Kraakman et al. eds., 2004).
309 See Mark T. Bradshaw et al., Accounting Choice, Home Bias, and US Investment
in Non-US Firms, 42 J. ACCT. REs. 795, 835 (2004) (finding that foreign investors are
more likely to invest in firms that have accounting systems with which they are familiar).
310 Franco, supra note 188, at 319.
311 Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 48, at 2394.
312 Coffee, Racing Towards the Top, supra note 5, at 1827.
313 Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 926 (1998)
[hereinafter Choi & Guzman, Portable Reciprocity].
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financial information are so obvious that Professor Romano is willing to
forfeit the underlying premise of regulatory competition in order to preserve
them. 314 Choi and Guzman emphasize diversity of issuer choice until push
comes to shove, and then they concede the considerable benefits of
standardization and suggest that regulatory competition need not be so
competitive after all. Choi has admitted that:
[t]o the extent at least some analysts are truthful in their opinions and the
market is unable to distinguish among truthful and corrupted analysts
perfectly, some corrupt analysts nevertheless may be successful in fooling
the market. Rational purchasers of securities that realize this possibility will
then demand a discount of all firms. 315
Despite warning signals, even the most sophisticated investors rode their
Enron stock right. into the basement 3 16 How are they to price the much less
indirect signals that come from firms selecting among a wide variety of
disparate securities regimes?
2. Shareholder Vote is Not a Significant Restraint
Except when the "outrage factor" moves directors to exert their legal
discretion, officers run public corporations. Shareholders have theoretical
influence in that they vote for directors, have the right to vote regarding
314 Because issuers who do not have a good story to tell and who opt into a regime
of little disclosure and less fraud enforcement will not wish to voluntarily disclose that
information, even Romano recognizes that something must be done. She proposes in the
state-competition version of her plan that issuers and brokers be required to inform
investors of the securities domicile applicable to that security. Romano, Empowering
Investors, supra note 48, at 2413. Choi and Guzman similarly recognize that issuers
cannot be trusted to disclose this information and that investors may not demand it, so
they similarly recommend that domestic legislatures pass laws requiring such disclosure.
Choi & Guzman, Portable Reciprocity, supra note 313, at 926.
Also, because issuers who do not have a good story to tell may wish to issue their
shares under a regime of full disclosure and fraud enforcement and then, having gotten
everybody's money, switch to a regime of little disclosure and less fraud enforcement,
Romano suggests that shareholder approval be required for such a change in domicile.
Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 48, at 2415-18. The need to prevent
managerial opportunism in such a way should undermine faith in a regime predicated on
the assumption that managers will opt for more disclosure so as to bond their firms'
reputations. If managers cannot be trusted to stay in the most efficient regime, how can
they be trusted to use it in the first place?
315 Choi, Selective Disclosures, supra note 290, at 551 (emphasis added).
316 Ribstein, supra note 54, at 8-9.
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major organic corporate changes, have the right to file derivative suits, and
the like. But, as Thompson and Sale have pointed out, "[s]hareholders vote,
sell, and sue, although each action occurs only in carefully measured doses
that, even collectively, do not change the ultimate control of the
corporation." 317
This general truth is especially accurate regarding incorporation
decisions. Shareholders do not choose where their company will incorporate,
by which jurisdiction's law it will be governed, or on which exchange it will
list. Furthermore, shareholders cannot now initiate a change in state of
incorporation 318 or a change regarding where the firm's shares are listed. Nor
would they be able to do so under most suggested regimes of state and
international securities law competition.
Because shareholders are so impotent in this regard, Delaware currently
has little incentive to cater to shareholder interests in a competitive regime
for corporate law, and other states, nations, and exchanges willsimilarly lack
incentive to create value for shareholders in a regime of competition to
provide securities law. 319
Many arguments about regulatory competition assume that law providers
will have an incentive to protect shareholder interests because shareholders
will reject a management initiative to reincorporate in Delaware (or to be
governed by the securities law of Peru) if it is not in their best interests.320
But there is little evidence that this is so. 321
Individual shareholders of public corporations simply do not have a
rational incentive to inform themselves regarding whether a management-
317 See Thompson & Sale, supra note 61, at 865.
318 See Choi & Guzman, Choice, supra note 249, at 972 ("Without management
support for reincorporation, the issue is not subject to a shareholder vote.").
319 Romano has discussed the statistics regarding shareholder proposals about
changes of the state of incorporation without noting that they demonstrate that the issue is
totally off the radar screen of most shareholders. ROMANO, ADVANTAGE, supra note 35,
at 72 (pointing out that from 1987 to 1994 only ten of 2042 shareholder proposals sought
reincorporation).
320 See Barzuza, supra note 32, at 163-65.
321 This fact renders Barzuza's price considerations analysis of regulatory
competition much less persuasive than it would otherwise be, notwithstanding his spirited
defense of shareholder input. See id. at 171-74. Barzuza argues that Delaware is
constrained in how far it can trend toward the bottom because although enacting
antishareholder provisions will attract management proposals for reincorporation to
Delaware, it will cause shareholders to resist reincorporation there unless benefits exceed
the costs of Delaware's franchise tax. However, there is little evidence that shareholders
pay any attention to the level of Delaware's franchise tax or that they would have an
ability to rationally monetize the value of various forms of state law that Delaware might
adopt.
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initiated change in state of incorporation (or jurisdiction of securities law or
exchange of listing) is actually in their best interest.322 They suffer from a
severe collective action problem. 323 Typically, no individual shareholder has
sufficient incentive to invest optimally in researching issues to be voted
upon.324  These considerations certainly apply to votes regarding
reincorporation or choice-of-regime decisions, which on their face seem not
terribly momentous. 325
A fall-back argument is that even if shareholders cannot vote effectively
regarding reincorporation decisions or relisting decisions, they can at least
punish directors when bad decisions are made. But this also seems unlikely.
Shareholders almost always vote for the incumbent slate of directors. 326 Even
if they are unhappy with decisions of their current directors, they almost
322 Id. at 142.
323 Coates points out that shareholders of public corporations face two collective
action problems:
First are costs of communication, negotiation, and coordination-which rise
dramatically as the number of shareholders increases. If shareholders differ even
modestly in how they trade off risk, liquidity, and control, attempts to negotiate and
coordinate as few as thirty dispersed shareholders are daunting. Second is the
problem of free-riding. Those attempting either to control the company or coordinate
shareholders will face the risk that the cost will fall on that shareholder, but benefits
will be shared.
John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable
Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CoRp. L. 837, 849 (1999); see also Bebchuk,
Desirable Limits, supra note 11, at 1460 ("[T]he requirement of shareholder approval is
frequently an ineffective constraint because of problems of information, collective action,
and distorted choice.").
324 Camara, supra note 264, at 1472 ("[Individual shareholders do] not have
sufficient incentive to invest optimally in investigating the consequences of potential
corporate actions when these consequences accrue to the corporation rather than to the
shareholder individually.").
Camara also notes that "[e]ven if shareholders were to invest irrationally in optimal
investigations, the result would be undesirable because their many costly investigations
would be redundant." Id. at 1474.
325 See Choi & Guzman, Choice, supra note 249, at 987.
326 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88
IowA L. REv. 1, 28 n. 118 (2002) (noting that proxy contests "are so costly and their
outcome so uncertain that they are invoked only episodically"); Margaret Blair & Lynn
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 310 (1999) ("In
both theory and practice, however, shareholders' voting rights-at least in publicly-
traded corporations-are so weak as to be virtually meaningless.").
1220 [Vol. 66:1155
REGULATORY COMPETITIONINVSECURlTIESLA W
never replace them.327 Nor is it feasible for them to consider doing so, in
most cases. 328 Furthermore, reincorporation or relisting decisions are simply
unlikely to be high on a list of shareholder priorities even if coordination and
other problems could be overcome.
For all of these reasons, shareholders overwhelmingly defer to directors'
judgment. For example, they approve ninety-nine percent of stock option
plans put before them,329 even though such options have become a
mechanism for wholesale misappropriation of shareholder assets.
330
Shareholders of acquiring corporations in stock-for-stock mergers almost
always approve them, even though results of such deals are decidedly
mixed. 33'
And shareholders automatically vote for most reincorporation proposals
as well. 332 Even when it is obvious that management is moving to a
327 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Designing a Shareholder Access Rule 1 (Harvard John M.
Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 461, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=511882 ("Although shareholder power to replace directors is
supposed to be an important element of our corporate governance system, it is largely a
myth."); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 Bus.
LAW. 43, 45 (2003) ("Attempts to replace directors are extremely rare, even in firms that
systematically under perform over a long period of time.").
328 Paredes, supra note 246, at 24 (noting that throwing out incumbent managers via
a proxy fight is not typically realistic "given the cost of running a proxy contest and the
practical difficulties shareholders have coordinating in support of a slate of nominees to
challenge the incumbent directors who typically are supported by, and in turn support,
incumbent management").
329 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder
Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 31, 58 (2000).
330 Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharoah 's Heart: Harnessing Altruistic Theory and
Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 811, 884
(2003) (noting that, in the area of executive compensation, "[t]he problem with elections
is that they have proven largely ineffective as a counterweight to management's power").
331 But see Timothy R. Burch, Angela Morgan & Jack G. Wolf, Is Acquiring-Firm
Shareholder Approval in Stock-for-Stock Mergers Perfunctory?, 33 FIN. MGMT. 45, 45
(Winter 2004) (concluding that shareholders' votes are meaningful even though none in
their sample failed and the average approval rate was ninety-five percent).
332 Situations in which shareholders have vetoed proposed reincorporations are
relatively rare. Such cases tend not to involve shareholders realizing that they are not
well-served by the reincorporation. Rather, they involve rare confluences of political
issues and the interests of nonshareholders, such as the Stanley Works decision not to
reincorporate from Connecticut to Bermuda for tax reasons. The board withdrew that
controversial proposal in the shadow of the Enron scandal and heavy pressure from labor
groups and communities. See Virginia Groark, Stanley Works Is Staying, and a Tax Issue
Remains, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, § 14CN at 1.
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jurisdiction with tougher antitakeover laws in a bid to stifle tender offers that
would benefit shareholders, defeats of management-backed reincorporation
proposals are rare.333
Romano and others count on institutional investors to save the day, but
this has not worked so far. Even if institutional investors desired to put in the
effort to overcome the limitations caused by unsophisticated investors, it is
questionable whether they could. And it is even more questionable whether
they have the will to do so in the long run.334 Most do not seem to have much
desire to play a role in upgrading corporate governance. 335 They have
repeatedly passed on opportunities to influence corporate behavior via
shareholder proposals.336  After Sarbanes-Oxley, they were "largely
A decidedly unscientific study finds that when one searches "approv! w/20 of
reincorporation" in Lexis-Nexis' News, All (English) data base, one gets 919 hits. When
one searches "defeat! w/20 reincorporation" into the same data base, one gets twenty-two
hits. When one searches "reject! w/20 reincorporation," one gets forty-four hits. Study
performed December 14, 2004.
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) statistics on file with the author indicate that
from 2001 to 2004, thirty-nine Russell 3000 companies put reincorporations up for
shareholder vote. Thirty-four were approved. In all of the other five, many more shares
were voted in favor of the reincorporation than against, but the proposals were apparently
done in by abstentions. Two of the corporations successfully completed the
reincorporations a year after the first unsuccessful vote.
333 See Warren Vieth, Fluorocarbon's Reincorporation Proposal Defeated, L.A.
TIMES, June 10, 1987, at 4:1. See also Greenwood, supra note 88, at 454 (noting that
shareholder votes regarding reincorporations are largely a formality, for managers control
the decision).
334 Romano suggests that institutional investors dominate and will prevent issuers
from switching mid-stream from the pro-investor regime they began with, to a less
protective regime. However, Choi points out that
unsophisticated investors may have a negative effect on other shareholders during a
shareholder vote, reducing the effectiveness of shareholder voting as a means of
aligning the incentives of managers and shareholders. Unsophisticated investors, for
example, are less likely to be informed on a particular vote or to own sufficient
shares to consider it worthwhile to make the investment to become so informed.
Choi, Issuer Choice, supra note 119, at 852.
335 See Adrian Michaels & Deborah Brewster, Waiting Outside the Boardroom: Will
Big US Shareholders Use Their Power to Hold Company Directors to Account?, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2003, at 21 ("[T]here is very little evidence that the people who own most
shares in US companies-the large institutional shareholders-are hankering for a greater
say in the nomination of directors.").
336 See id. (noting that "institutional investors are often criticized for not making use
of their existing powers to influence corporate decision-making" and observing that only
thirty of 800 shareholder govemance proposals put forth in 2003 came from mutual funds
and pension funds).
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inarticulate" regarding corporate governance reforms.337 One problem may
be motivation. Large mutual funds are courting companies seeking
investment management fees, so they are loath to rock the corporate
governance boat.338 Similar motivations may account for their failure to take
a stand against egregiously excessive executive pay.339 Another problem may
be that institutional investors are generally subject to the same cognitive and
behavioral limitations as other investors. 340
The bottom line is that there are too many situations in which the
assumption that the shareholders will restrain managers who do not choose
the jurisdiction with the law that best favors shareholder interests does not
hold.
VII. THE END OF SECURITIES LAW?
Thus far, the tone of this Article has been somewhat depressing. Self-
serving managers mistreat shareholders and are, perhaps, aided and abetted
by regulators. Everywhere we look the regulatory competition race is
modest, but descending. Woe unto us all!
However, as I have noted elsewhere,341 around the world there has been
a strong trend toward the top in the past few years. European and Asian
countries have been aggressively moving toward what I call the "strong-
SEC" model developed in the United States. Virtually all developed nations
have created central regulatory authorities, banned insider trading, required
more disclosure by issuers and other actors in the securities markets,
337 Adrian Michaels, Funds Under Fire for Lack of Initiative, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7,
2003, at 34 (quoting governance expert Ira Millstein).
338 See Michaels & Brewster, supra note 336, at 21 (quoting corporate governance
lawyer Ira Millstein for the observation that "there are subtle conflicts working at every
level").
339 Dorff suspects the reason that the market has not cured excessive compensation
is that the big institutional investors who could do something (a) diversify their portfolios
and use indexing, which shields them from the effects of any one company, and
(b) typically have strong ties to companies in which they have substantial investments.
Dorff, supra note 331, at 835-37.
340 Institutional investors seem to be easily fooled by earnings management, for
example. See Reed Abelson, Truth or Consequence? Hardly, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1996,
at Fl (noting that most companies manipulate financial statements and that the markets
are influenced by those manipulated numbers). Another study finds that professional
investors exhibit even more myopic loss aversion than student subjects. See Michael S.
Haigh & John A. List, Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An
Experimental Analysis, 60 J. FN. 523 (2005).
341 See Prentice, Strong SEC, supra note 3, at 51-56.
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punished fraud more severely, and dramatically improved corporate
governance. There has been a convergence toward American-style securities
law342 and toward what might be considered the "best practices" of
American corporate governance. 343 What accounts for this? How has the
race-to-the-bottom pressure exerted by the traditional regulatory competition
model's reliance on corporate managers to pick the regulatory regime been
overcome? In addition to the fact that regulatory competition is a very weak
force in the securities law universe, I credit six factors.
First, is the obvious success of the American model. American capital
markets are the widest, deepest, and most efficient in the world and many
credit their success to the aggressiveness of the SEC and the effectiveness of
the legal regime it enforces. 344
Second, is the very substantial body of cross-national empirical evidence
that has been accumulating in recent years, strongly indicating that countries
following the strong-SEC model by requiring disclosure, punishing fraud,
prohibiting insider trading, and enforcing laws via a strong central agency
supplemented by private rights to sue will generally have stronger capital
markets and more vibrant economies. 345
342 See id. at 56 and accompanying text.
343 See generally REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW:
A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2004); CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004).
344 See Rock, supra note 185, at 694 ("Investment capital is available all over the
world, yet it is the U.S. capital markets, under the SEC disclosure system, that are
without peer in the public financing of new enterprises, high tech and otherwise,
domestic and foreign.").
345 Cross and I have reviewed this empirical evidence and added modestly to it
ourselves. See Prentice & Cross, supra note 3, at 31-51. See also Laura Nyantung Beny,
Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence, 7 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 144, 144 (finding that countries with stronger insider trading laws enjoy
"more diffuse equity ownership, more accurate stock prices, and more liquid stock
markets") (emphasis omitted); Utpal Bhattachayra & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of
Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, 75 (2002) ("[T]he cost of equity in a country, after
controlling for a number of variables, does not change after the introduction of insider
trading laws, but decreases significantly after the first prosecution."); Hazem Daouk,
Charles M.C. Lee, & David Ng, Capital Market Governance: How Do Security Laws
Affect Market Performance? 26 (unpublished working paper, Feb. 28, 2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=702682 ("[I]mproved security laws are associated with
decreased cost of capital, higher trading volume, greater market depth, increased U.S.
ownership, lower price synchronicity, and reduced IPO underpricing."); Luzi Hail &
Christian Leuz, International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal
Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter? 4 (ECGI Law Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 15, 2003; AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings; Rodney L. White Ctr.
for Fin. Res., Working Paper No. 17-04, 2004) available at
1224 [Vol. 66:1155
REGULATORY COMPETITIONN SECURITIES LA W
Third, give credit to the federal government. As noted earlier, the
primary pressure upon Delaware to encourage it occasionally to protect
shareholders rather than just to cater to managers' interests is the
countervailing pressure of potential federal regulation. In times of crisis, if
Delaware does not act aggressively to protect investors, the SEC (or even
Congress) has done so and certainly may do so again. 346
The SEC also raises the practices of nations around the world in three
ways. Initially, the SEC requires foreign companies that wish to sell their
securities to American investors to meet most American standards. This
necessarily has an impact upon these companies' practices back home.34 7
Several years ago, large German companies that desired to list in the U.S.
encouraged German regulators to switch to Anglo-American style accounting
so that they would not have to prepare two completely disparate sets of
books.348 Furthermore, the SEC is somewhat aggressive in applying its
antifraud mechanisms to punish fraud occurring abroad that impacts
American markets and to protect foreign investors who are injured by fraud
that occurs in the U.S. 349 This has a ripple effect regarding acceptable
practices. Finally, the SEC jawbones foreign governments. For many years it
has been a strong advocate for more disclosure, prohibitions on insider
trading, and other antifraud activities.
http://ssm.com/abstract=641981 (finding that countries with extensive securities
regulation and strong enforcement mechanisms exhibit lower levels of cost of capital than
nations with weak legal institutions, even when other factors are controlled for); Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?
I (Tuck Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 03-22; AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings,
2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=425880 (finding that disclosure and liability
rules benefit stock markets); Ross Levine, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, 8 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 8, 33 (1999) ("Countries where corporations publish relatively
comprehensive and accurate financial statements have better developed financial
intermediaries than countries where published information on corporations is less
reliable.").
346 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
347 For example, Baums notes that when German companies list on foreign
exchanges, such as those in America, they must comply with higher standards, and this
internationalization brings the expectations of multinational investors into the German
market. See Theodor Baums, Company Law Reform in Germany 2 (unpublished working
paper, July 4, 2002), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-329962.
348 See David Waller, Daimler-Benz Gears Up for a Drive on the Freeway, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 1993, at 18.
349 See Sue Reisinger, SEC Takes Aim Beyond U.S. Borders: As the Markets
Become More Global, So Does the Enforcement, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 26, 2004, at 8, 12
(noting the SEC's aggressive role in Parmalat and Vivendi scandals).
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Fourth, give additional credit to Sarbanes-Oxley. The most important
reform of American securities laws in sixty years, by being aggressively
extraterritorial, has been credited for bringing about many changes:
* Far-reaching changes in the way major accounting and auditing firms
are supervised around the world;
" A push toward aligning corporate governance in Europe and other parts
of the world with the standards and practices prevailing in the capital
market-based U.S. financial and corporate system;
* EU reform initiatives to modernize company law and enhance
corporate governance aimed at strengthening shareholders' rights,
reinforcing protection for employees and creditors, increasing the
efficiency and competitiveness of European business, and boosting
confidence in capital markets; and
" Governments willing to bring forward on a national level long-delayed
legislation on financial disclosure for corporate management and
tougher regulations designed to curtail fraud in the financial
industry.350
A fifth factor is Enron-like scandals occurring in Europe. 351 Scandals
involving Parmalat in Italy,352 Royal Ahold in Holland,353 Vivendi in
France,354 and a number of companies in Germany 355 put pressure on those
350 Klaus C. Engelen, Lemons Into Lemonade: How the United States Turned an
Ugly Accounting Scandal Into a Mighty Lever for Global Financial Oversight and
Regulation, INT'L ECON., Sept. 22, 2004, at 56-57.
351 See Klaus C. Engelen, Preventing European "Enronitis, " INT'L EcON., June 22,
2004, at 40 (noting that Enron and comparable scandals in Europe place European leaders
"under mounting pressure from global markets and an increasingly critical general
public" to speed up modernization of financial market oversight structure).
352 See Tobias Buck, Alarm Spreads as Virus Crosses the Pond, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
15, 2004, at 2 ("[T]he general drift is unmistakable: after Parmalat, reform of Europe's
corporate governance rules is firmly under way."); Guido Alessandro Ferrarini & Paolo
Giudici, Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement: The Parmalat Case 56
(ECGI Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 40, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=-730403 (noting how the Parmalat scandal highlighted Italy's
(and Europe's) need to reform in order to be more facilitative of private efforts to enforce
securities laws).
353 See Brian Hanney, Ahold: The European Enron?, ACCOUNTANcY, Apr. 1, 2003,
42, at 42-43 (analyzing Ahold scandal).
354 See Samer Iskandar, Financial Profile: Michel Prada, AMF Chairman, Keeps
France on the Road to Radical Reform, FINANCIALNEWS ONLINE, Oct. 24, 2004 (noting
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nations, as the Enron scandals put pressure on the American Congress, to
improve securities laws and corporate governance in order to restore faith in
the capital markets.
Sixth, as Kamar has recently observed, although European nations do not
compete for incorporations, that very fact makes it necessary for them to
compete for infusions of capital. 356 The American experience, the empirical
evidence, and common sense all tell these nations that, in order for their
home companies to compete for capital that flows with increasing fluidity
across international borders, they must erect legal structures to protect
investors. Managers and majority shareholders who may profit more from
operating under the old rules are unlikely to push for such reforms in
sufficient numbers. Fortunately, the European nations especially have
performed their own intensive studies of capital market development. The
Vienot and Marini reports in France, the Higgs Report in England, the
Aldama Report in Spain, and various EU reports 357 are examples. Almost
without exception, these reports recommend reforms that closely emulate the
strong-SEC model and many of the reports' recommendations have already
been implemented. As noted, virtually every major European and Asian
government has in recent years created a central agency to enforce securities
laws, increased the amount of mandatory disclosure, stiffened penalties for
fraud, enacted insider trading prohibitions, and made it easier for injured
investors to vindicate their rights.358
This is not the type of regulatory competition envisioned by Romano and
others. 359 It mandates less, not more, issuer choice. It involves more, not less,
that French reform was catalyzed by the need to restore market confidence after three-
year bear market interspersed with scandals such as Vivendi's).
355 See generally Baums, supra note 348 (noting how scandals involving German
companies seemingly necessitated significant legal reform).
356 See Kamar, Beyond Competition, supra note 121.
357 See Richard Donkin, Steps Towards Design of the Perfect Board: The Biggest
Impact of an Imminent Report Is Likely to Be on the Degree of Independence and the
Quality of Supervision Expected of Non-Executives, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2003, at 12
(discussing England's 2003 Higgs Report); Samer Iskandar, Progressive is Impressive,
FIN. TIMES, June 14, 2000, at 8 (noting French improvements in corporate governance
enacted since 1995 Vienot Report); French Public Losing Confidence in Auditors, THE
ACCOUNTANT, Jan. 1997, at 4 (noting corporate governance proposals of France's 1996
Marini Report); Spain: New Law for the Post-Enron Era, INT'L ACCT. BULL., Sept. 12,
2003, at 11 (noting many changes for the accounting profession and corporate
governance recommended by Spain's 2003 Aldama report).
358 See Prentice, Strong SEC, supra note 3, at 51-56.
359 Romano argues that the key point in favor of regulatory competition is that "no
government entity can know better than market participants what regulations are in their
interest, particularly as firms' requirements are continually changing with shifting
financial market conditions." ROMANO, ADVANTAGE, supra note 35, at 45. The logical
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governmental interference in the markets. Private contracting is only a small
part of the picture. But this new movement means that European and Asian
regulation is rapidly converging upon the American model that embodies
what strongly appear to be "best practices" insofar as we can know them
given our current state of knowledge. Most importantly, these reforms mostly
involve governments setting thresholds for appropriate behavior, rather than
allowing managers to choose the rules by which they will be governed.
Unlike regulatory competition premised on managers' decisions to do what is
in the best interests of their firm-when there is so much evidence that they
too frequently do not-this new trend involves lawmakers looking around
the world at what works in practice.
IX. CONCLUSION
Over the past quarter century many of the brightest minds in legal
academia have been engaged in a quixotic quest to replace the current system
of federal securities regulation with either regulatory competition or private
contracting. The real world has paid little attention to the raging scholarly
debate, and for good reason.
The key to making needed improvements in securities regulation does
not lie in any regime of regulatory competition proffered thus far. There is
strikingly persuasive evidence that states do not meaningfully compete to
provide corporate law and have little reason to do so. Delaware won the
battle for incorporations long ago and has only widened its lead over the last
century. Therefore, even Delaware has little motivation to create innovative
laws to attract incorporations and certainly other states do not. Corporate
regulatory competition is a pleasant dream, but little more.
To the modest extent that competition does exist, it tends to pander to the
interests of those who make the incorporation decisions--corporate
managers. It tends not to advance the interests of shareholders. Only the
constant worry that bad behavior will cause additional federal encroachment
prevents Delaware lawmakers from further eviscerating shareholder interests.
For these reasons, those interested in the future of securities regulation
should not look to corporate regulatory competition as a model for future
action. There is little reason to think that states or nations will be interested in
competing to provide securities law. There is even less reason to think that if
states, nations, or exchanges do compete to provide securities law that the
results will be efficacious. This Article has examined the evidence regarding
extension of this argument is that there should be no regulation at all, for if the parties are
wise enough to choose among regimes with various types of regulation and regimes with
no regulation at all, they should do just fine making their own arrangements. See
Trachtman, supra note 107, at 22 (pointing out that "this statement is really an argument
against any regulation at all, but very little support is provided for this argument").
1228 [Vol. 66:1155
REGULATORY COMPETITION IN SECURITIES LA W
state competition to provide securities law, national competition to provide
securities law, and domestic and international exchange competition for
listings. In each area, the better evidence indicates that a meandering saunter
to the bottom is much more likely than a vigorous hike to the top.
This Article has also explained why the pervasive trend in all of these
forms of regulatory competition is downward. Corporate law and much of
securities law exist to solve the agency problem. Yet regulatory competition
simply assumes away this problem, claiming that firms know what is in their
best interests better than governments. But the real choice is not between
firms and the SEC, it is between managers and the SEC. Managers are in an
inherent conflict of interest situation. The SEC is not. Corporate and
securities rules exist largely to restrain managers, yet regulatory competition
entrusts managers to select the rules by which their conduct will be governed.
All things being equal, managers do not wish to disclose, because they
do not wish to be monitored any more than they have to be. They avoid
antifraud laws, because they naturally prefer to escape liability. They would
not voluntarily choose a regime that prohibits insider trading, because the
practice is profitable. They do not embrace strong central securities agencies,
because then all of these rules and prohibitions have bite.
Yet a formidable body of empirical evidence indicates that economies
are stronger and capital markets are deeper and more efficient in nations in
which securities law is stringent, disclosure is mandatory, fraud is punished,
and insider trading is prohibited. 360 This is not the model that managers tend
to choose voluntarily, but it is the model that works. Indeed, all around the
world, countries wishing to improve their markets and economies are
adopting and adapting the strong-SEC model, not looking to replace it.
European and Asian nations are creating their own versions of the SEC,
increasing disclosure requirements, banning insider trading, and stiffening
penalties for securities fraud. Given difference of law, culture, and
infrastructure, these efforts will be met with varying degrees of success, but
as a general rule the trend is salutary.
It is therefore time to refocus attention upon improving the existing
strong-SEC model. It will not be replaced any time soon. 361 While academics
360 Coffee, Racing Towards the Top, supra note 5, at 1763 n.15 (citing studies);
Prentice & Cross, supra note 3 (citing studies and adding additional evidence).
361 Even if it were not the best available option, path dependence considerations
would ensure its survival. See Hillary A. Sale, Gatekeepers, Disclosure, and Issuer
Choice, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 403 (2003); Tung, Translation, supra note 122, at 573-
81. Pritchard has observed that "[g]overmnent regulation is far too entrenched in the
United States for self-regulation to be a likely alternative today." Pritchard, Self-
Regulation, supra note 182, at 35.
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can debate the finer points of regulatory competition, few, if any, serious
market participants in the real world embrace it in any of its suggested forms
as a viable vision of the future of securities regulation.362 Those people in
business who would theoretically profit from the diverse choices that would
spring from regulatory competition (or from regimes of private contracting)
in securities regulation have made clear their preference for exactly the
opposite sort of regime-one of uniformity and coordination. 363
While it would be an overstatement to claim that regulatory competition
never exists or that its influence is inevitably pernicious, the capital markets
will be best served by having our brightest minds focus upon improving
rather than replacing the existing strong-SEC model. 364
A sufficiently strong and coordinated move by business certainly could have an
impact, but the harsh truth is that no issuers or securities industry groups seem
particularly enamored of regulatory competition for securities law. See Tung, Passports,
supra note 7, at 374, 388-89 (noting that the political pressure thwarting such regulatory
competition will likely be much stronger than that supporting it).
362 See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 422 (2003) ("[T]he
mandatory disclosure debate has been settled for seventy years, since the Securities Act
of 1933 was adopted.").
363 See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A
Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 531, 537-43 (2001) (noting that both in
domestic and international securities regulation, key economic actors seem to be adopting
not regulatory competition "but its opposite"); Tung, Monopolists, supra note 5, at 1422
(noting the irony that "'corporate America'-issuers and institutional investors, who are
supposed direct beneficiaries of issuer choice-implicitly reject it").
364 1 am not yet ready to take the strong-SEC argument to the potentially logical
conclusion of recommending federal incorporation in the U.S., or a single worldwide
securities regulator. Reasonable arguments could be made for both propositions, but I do
not go there. Eliot Spitzer has demonstrated that there are at least some countervailing
advantages to our crazy-quilt federalist system. See McDonnell, Two Cheers, supra note
63, at 140 ("[A]s a whole this mixed federal system of corporate law seems to work
pretty well-at least as compared with any alternative on offer.").
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